THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

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EXISTENTIALISM IN FRANCE TODAY

RENE ARNOU, S.J.

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS

MARIE LOUISE MARTINEZ

ST. THOMAS AND THE *VERBUM*: AN INTERPRETATION

MATTHEW J. O'CONNELL, S.J.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

OOK REVIEWS

BOOK NOTICES

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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy

EXISTENTIALISM IN FRANCE TODAY*

CONCERNING EXISTENTIALISM IN GENERAL

It may be said in general that existentialism is a revolt against the xaggerations of abstract reason which pretends to explain everyiing by means of imposing logical constructs, but in fact leaves the roblems of life quite unsolved. Kierkegaard blamed Hegelianism for l the evils of his day, while Gabriel Marcel, brooding over the influıces that shaped his thought, speaks of the "exasperation" that possssed him when he thought he saw Fichte attempting to deduce the npiric self from the transcendental self. He admits the possibility establishing that the self should present a certain characteristic of the npiric self; but in such a case there could only be question of the npiric self in general.

> Now the empiric self in general is a mere fiction. What really exists, and what really has any importance, is this individual, the real individual which is my self, with all the unbelievably fine detail of his experience, with all the determinations resulting from individual experience which he alone and no other besides can live.

ny attempt to deduce such a thing as this is quite absurd.[1]

The existentialist is not at all interested in beauty in general or in perty in general, any more than in existence in general, since all this nonexistent. His concern is altogether with the concrete existing ing, and particularly with that existing thing which is himself; in a ord, with the singular and incommunicable existence in which his own ing and that of the universe are revealed to him and which sets fore him a choice which he cannot escape.

Reactions, however legitimate, seldom manage to stay within wise nits. The existentialists, in their desire to remedy the exaggerations

*This article has been translated from the original French manuscript by the everend Christian L. Bonnet, S.J.

[1] G. Marcel, "Valeur et immutabilité," in *Homo Viator* (Aubier, 1944), . 190-91.

of rationalism, go to the opposite extreme and eventually deny the validity of reason. This means that not only the idealism of Fichte or of Hegel, but every form of speculative philosophy as well and every kind of demonstration is questioned. The reason the existentialists give to justify this condemnation (for they still make use of reason, and indeed they must, even to outlaw reasoning itself) is that by reasoning all that can be attained is something "general," that is, an "object" of thought, abstracting from the fact that it is. The truly unique element in the concrete individual, the real existing thing, can never thus be reached, for it does not lend itself to the process of demonstration. Demonstration may have its place in the "objective" sciences, since the "object" in these is heterogeneous to being; it is quite otherwise where there is question of existing being.

Utterly mistaken, then, would be the attempt to find in existentialism some system of theses and proofs. Can it even properly be referred to as a philosophy? It is in this connection that the distinction has been made between "existential philosophers" and "philosophers of existence." According to Nicolas Berdyaev[2] *existential* philosophy is the expression of an existential experience, and it gives great value to philosophers even as existing beings. On the contrary, the philosophy *of existence* makes existence an object of the philosopher's knowledge though Jaspers says that existence can never be such an object. Thus in the one case, there is an experience of existence, and in the other a speculation which suppresses this existence by making an object of it. Such would be the "existential" analysis of Heidegger, who seeks to discover the ontological conditions of any philosophy of existence. According to this interpretation, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche would be existential philosophers, whereas Heidegger and Jaspers would not. Berdyaev goes so far as to suggest that Hegel himself answered the requirements even more than they "because Hegel lived in the medium of dialectic. He experienced it. For him it was existence in a sense."

But Karl Jaspers, invited by the Société Française de Philosophie to express his views on this question, declared[3] that, to his way of thinking, a theory of existence suppresses existence only inasmuch as it attempts to explain existence in terms of concepts, as if concepts could ever decide anything concerning a concrete situation; that he himself had never had such an illusion; and that he was not unaware of the fact that philosophy, rationally expressed, "remains as such an ope

[2] Cf. "Subjectivité et transcendance," *Bulletin de la société française de philosophie*, 1937, pp. 187-88.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 195 f.

onstruct, the realization of which is in each case the business of the ne who thinks it." A theory of existence is a preparation, a stimulant o this personal labor; it is not something ready-made to be passed on rom master to pupil. Consequently, "whoever communicates himelf by means of a philosophy must adopt an attitude contrary to that f a dictator, and he does this by almost disappearing into an apparent lexibility and absence of resistance, thus leaving a completely free space or the listener." A man in his temporal being alone is existence. He vill find the concrete reality of existence in himself and in himself lone.

Thus it is that for Karl Jaspers the philosophy of existence, though it s not existentialism—that is, the lived experience of a concrete existnce—and though it can never be existentialism, would nevertheless ot constitute a danger for him, but rather a means and a way to xistentialism. In other words, existentialism, simply lived, should be ilent. In expressing itself, it becomes in some manner a kind of heory of existence, which is no longer strictly singular, since it does ommunicate itself. Nevertheless, this theory of existence can keep ot only the name of existentialism but its reality as well, provided it resents itself not as a ready-made truth which need only be received, ut as an experience which every individual must live and which he can rasp only by living it.

The proper existential method is therefore not a method of reasoning vhich would aim at proving anything, nor even a method of exposition y which the professor would endeavor to communicate ideas which are is and not the student's. Such ideas would run the danger of remainng forever foreign to the student, whereas the purpose of education is o bring the student to exist in what he understands. But, to quote Kierkegaard, "to exist in what is understood is something that cannot e communicated directly to an existing mind."[4] The indirect method lone is able to do this, a method which leads the student to enter nto himself, into his own experience, without any intermediary, and hus find the justification for a complete assent.

Although it is not strictly speaking a philosophy, existentialism does ot give up every attempt to exercise influence. Else, why attempt to xpress itself? The fact that it tries to spread its view of things shows hat it is not altogether indifferent but wants that view to be more niversally known. However, rather than a doctrine which seeks to npose itself by force of cogent arguments or simply to explain itself n ideas clear and easy to understand, it is an experience inviting to nitation, a sort of witness to a fact.

[4] *Post-Scriptum*, p. 193.

Its means of expression will therefore be greatly varied; and of these means the most effective will be those which adapt themselves most flexibly to concrete life and are most capable of suggesting the elements in life which cannot be formulated. Without necessarily abandoning weighty thesis and abstract treatment, its preference falls on newspaper, essay, poem, play, novel. Of course, the novel presents a thesis, but that thesis is all in action, images, and feelings. This policy has made existentialism available to everyone and is in great measure responsible for the noticeable success of the system.

Some examples from the most important French existentialists will exemplify this. Jean-Paul Sartre is a novelist, a dramatist, a professor of philosophy. Of his works we must mention *L'Etre et le néant,* his most important work; novels like *Huis-clos, Les Mouches, Les Chemins de la liberté,* I. *L'Age de raison,* II. *Le Sursis;* and a monthly review, *Les Temps modernes* (begun in 1945), whose better known contributors are, besides Sartre himself and Simone de Beauvoir, Raymond Aron and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. There is Simone de Beauvoir, whose thought closely resembles that of Sartre, the author of *Pyrrhus et Cinéas, L'Invitée, Le Sang des autres.* Albert Camus, a journalist rather than a professional philosopher (he has written a great deal in *Combat*), contributes an essay on existentialism, *Le Mythe de Sisyphe;* a novel, *L'Etranger;* and plays, *Le Malentendu* and *Caligula.* From Gabriel Marcel we have the *Journal métaphysique, Etre et avoir, Du refus à l'invocation, Homo Viator, Prolégomènes à une métaphysique de l'espérance,* as well as plays, the most interesting of which from our point of view is *Le Monde cassé,* followed by *Positions et approches concrètes du mystère ontologique.*

Considering the supreme importance given to the subject by existentialism it is scarce surprising that its most able defenders should be quite at odds among themselves. Gabriel Marcel and Jean-Paul Sartre are metaphysically poles apart, and Albert Camus takes it very ill when he is put in a class with the others. Still, public opinion looks on them all as existentialists, not only because of their common opposition to traditional philosophy, but because there does exist some harmony among them, harmony not precisely in their attitude of mind, and still less in a similarity of definitive preference, but rather in a certain bias of thought. Our purpose is to bring out these similarities, together with the profound differences, in the exposition which follows.

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

Heidegger makes this statement: "For me the haunting question is

ıot man's existence, but that of being in its totality and as such."[5] A hilosophy of being is also what Jean-Paul Sartre gives us in *L'Etre t le néant.* His starting point is "phenomenological" reflection, the conideration of objects as they appear to consciousness; but his ultimate urpose is to erect a "phenomenological ontology," as the subtitle of is work indicates, and thus give not only a mere description of the tructures of being which reflection distils from experience, but a sort f metaphysic as well. His work is an attempt to rediscover, beyond he "situations" which fix each human being in reference to the entire vorld, the a priori conditions common to all.

And yet his thought may truly be called existential, inasmuch as for im there remains nothing universal which man should make his own r to which he should conform, nothing permanent, no human nature. n the "Présentation" of his ideas which he offers us in the first issue f *Les Temps modernes,* he states:

> As we see it, what men have in common is not a nature but a metaphysical condition. By that we understand the totality of constraints which limit them a priori, such as the necessity of being born and of dying, of being a finite being, and of existing in the world in the midst of other men.

There are, therefore, no essences, but only existences which make hemselves.

Sartre's use of the term "a priori" must not mislead us. He does not ook upon being as existing only inasmuch as it appears, nor is it a 'phenomenon" in the Kantian meaning of the word. Every conscious- ıess is a consciousness of something and implies a being which is not tself and which *in itself* exists. This affirmation is at the very core of Sartre's thought.

In Kierkegaard, subjective thinker that he is, we find passionate nterest focussed on the existing subject. Here the interest is concenrated on the "in-itself." However, this interest in no wise partakes f admiration, for the most striking thing about this being "is its ontingency. I mean to say that, by definition, existence is not neces- ity. To exist is simply *to be there.* Still, what is there might not ıave existed, might have existed in different form." Whence the conlusion—not that appeal must be made to another being, distinct from tself, to account for it—but that there is no explanation possible or it, since it cannot be a necessary deduction by thought, nor taken rom nothingness as being. In regard to it there is no other question o be asked. "Full of itself, without reason for its existence, without

[5] Letter addressed to the Société Française de Philosophie. Cf. *Bulletin,* 937, p. 193.

any relation to any other being, the being in itself is too much f eternity."[6]

For Heidegger, contingency leads to obsession and to death. F Sartre, it gives rise to disgust for a being which has reference to not ing, fits into nothing, and is altogether "gratuitous" and superfluo for our understanding. "When one becomes aware of it, it turns t stomach, everything goes around in circles . . . ; it is nauseating." T being which we are, known as it is, can only nauseate us.

Consciousness is necessarily "intentional." As consciousness something which is not itself, it is transcendental and ever tends to beyond itself. But on the other hand—and this is the tragic aspect the situation—it can be consciousness of another thing only by becomi that other thing. It can therefore be consciousness only on the con tion of not being what it is. That is why consciousness is forev unsatisfied. It is what it is not; it is not what it is. Worse still, is always in bad faith. It desires to be something else, tending as does to the totality of being in itself; but it cannot become that. realizes the impossibility of its attempt to cease being what it is sin consciousness cannot become being *in itself* without ceasing to be *itself*. The proper task of the condition of human existence is to effe a coexistence of these oppositions.

To be conscious of himself, each of us must establish himself in re tion to the world: I am for myself only inasmuch as I oppose myself other beings, to which I become present only because I am not what th are. These beings are given to me by reason of an act which exclud them from me and constitutes them for me. This act is the act consciousness, whose function therefore—to use the barbarous expressi so beloved by Sartre—consists in "nothing-ing" (*néantir*), that is, introducing into the very heart of being, into the very heart of the wor an element of nonbeing.

Thus appears the *compact* mass of the "in-oneself," a limitation, t being which I am, this being and not the other beings, in a given det mined situation, by reason of an act of internal negation.

Whence the incoherent, incomprehensible character of my being. regards my ontological structure, it belongs to me to be what I am and not to be what I am.

Whence also, in the too-great-fullness of being in itself is the ori of all virtualities, of liberty, of the possibility of a choice.

While being in itself is comparable in its massive self-sufficie to "a pea in a box of peas . . . , quite round, closed up in itself, inco

[6] *L'Être et le néant*, p. 34.

unicable,"[7] being for itself is situated as regards the rest of the world its act; and inasmuch as it has opened itself to other men, it has wen itself a value and given a value to the universe.

Sartre never tires of lauding this act and this liberty. This is what metimes gives his expositions and the characters of his plays a rtain character of grandeur and even of heroism. "We are what we oose, and we have the value of what we have chosen," is his way of tting it. And the fact is that since there is no human nature, man precisely what he makes himself; each of his acts is a choice, a choice which he alone must make the decision. This is what liberty calls for.

But, on reflection, what worth does this liberty have? Any value ould have to be the synthesis of the "in-itself" and the "for-oneself." ut this is an impossible synthesis, and any attempt to realize it would illusory. All values are subjective. At the beginning of my liberty ere is in no sense the power of associating myself to the work of God, ut only the "nothing-ing" (*néantissante*) function of consciousness. iberty is a slavery which is imposed on us together with existence. Ve are "condemned to be free." And so my liberty, just like my con-iousness, belongs to the realm of illusion. It is everything and it a nothing, a nothing which is everything.

And what of our relations with other men? If we take the word of artre, another man does not constitute for me a remedy for loneliness; nd still less is he the occasion of a gift which enriches me by leading e to go outside of myself and improve myself. Rather is he a danger, threat: "He robs me of the world!" Curiosity or jealousy leads e to listen at a keyhole, all engrossed in this act in which he is the bject, the center of an entire world! Suddenly he hears footsteps hind him. Someone else is looking at him. Behold! He and his hole world have become the world of another; from subject he has come object, changed into a thing. And *shame* overwhelms him. s Sartre puts it, the experience of the universe runs off as into a sewer hen another appears on the scene.

For me, then, the other exists as a subject at the moment when I n aware of myself as reduced by him to the state of object. That her is my transcendence, transcended. For me he is always, essen-ally, the unjust aggressor, whence between him and me there can ever be anything but a state of war; it is all a matter of suppress-g or being suppressed. Mutual respect, as well as personal dignity, iendship, and any love other than mere desire—all of these are but usions.

[7] "Présentation," *Les Temps modernes*, No. 1.

But then, would it not be better to live in a state of illusion, as do those citizens of Argos, dramatized in *Les Mouches*,[8] who live in the illusion of a sin which must be expiated, of values which must be respected, and of an existence directed to an end, a moral and religious illusion? While Orestes, unhampered by remorse, Orestes, the gentle young man, capable of killing his mother and his mother's lover and then going his way peacefully "with dripping hands and pure conscience"[9]—while Orestes wants to open their eyes, Jupiter strives to dissuade him. "Poor people! You are going to make them a gift of loneliness and shame. You are going to snatch off the garment in which I have clothed them, and you will suddenly show them their existence, their obscene and insipid existence, which is given to them for no purpose."[10]

But Orestes carries out his purpose. "Why should I refuse them the despair which is in me, since it is their lot?" Sartre agrees with Orestes: Man's destiny is awful; existence is given to him for no purpose. His greatness consists precisely in seeing with authentic insight his nothingness and the real emptiness of his action, instead of deceiving himself with illusory consolations; it consists in standing up in the midst of the horrible night into which he is flung, accepting the condition of human existence and the despair which is inherent in it. This is true existence and this is salvation, since man is thus freed from illusion.

But is this not flight from one illusion only to fall into another? Why should we stand up rather than bow down? Why should we "engage ourselves" in action if action is equally without rule and without purpose? Sartre has great interest in the subject, in the action of this subject and in his liberty. Yet, it is clearly understood that the subject is nothingness, that liberty is itself a nothing, a nothing which is everything. Existence is reduced to the passing act—a foundationless, isolated, incoherent, ephemeral "realization" of the nothingness in being which keeps itself alive only by engaging itself at every instant, and whose odor, the flat odor of contingency, of nothingness, brings on nausea.

This is the picture we get of man and of the world once we have severed the bond which connects them to the transcendent Reality. They are emptied. God or nothing![11]

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[8] In *Les Mouches*, the flies symbolize the remorse and anguish for sin which weigh upon Argos since the murder of Agamemnon.

[9] *Les Mouches*, p. 100.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 136.

[11] Concerning Sartre, cf. G. Marcel, "L'Etre et le néant," in *Homo Viator*, pp. 233-56; Jeanne Mercier, "Jean-Paul Sartre," *Etudes*, February, 1945; Roger Troisfontaines, *Le Choix de J.-P. Sartre, Exposé et critique de L'Etre et le néant* (Aubier, 1945).

The necessary, unquestionable starting point of reflection is the surdity of the world, the absurdity of existence, its irrationality and ntinual lack of harmony with the desire for clearness etched in our epest self. According to Albert Camus this is what must rule man's hole conduct.

Furthermore, the philosophical problem par excellence is to know hether there does not follow from this an exigency to free ourselves as uickly as possible from this incomprehensible condition. Does not uicide follow as a logical necessity? This problem is examined in *e Mythe de Sisyphe.*

Albert Camus replies that the question is not to know whether life as any meaning, as if it had to have some meaning in order to be lived. n the contrary, since it is absurd, it will be the better lived the less eaning it has. What we need then is, in living, to hold on to the surd element, the friction, the opposition. Now suicide is an attempt solve what is absurd. It tries to escape an incomprehensible situ-ion by denying one of the terms of the contradiction; but in so doing steps out of the very conditions of the problem, for what is absurd lows of no solution.

This is also how Albert Camus, faced by the opinion that catalogues m as one of the foremost defenders of the new view, defends himself gainst the charge of existentialism. Indeed, he sees the existential titude of mind as a philosophical suicide—that is, thought's own denial itself—since in order to escape the absurd it rushes into the unknow-le, tending thus to surpass itself in what constitutes its negation. For the existentialist, negation is his god. Precisely, this god sustains mself only through negation of human reason." It is obvious that hen he wrote this Albert Camus was acquainted only with that form existentialism which empties into the transcendent, in the style of ierkegaard.

For Albert Camus, then, "to live is to cause the absurd to live." his, of course, without attempting to reduce the absurd, and still, with-t accepting it. The only possible attitude that remains is that of fusal, the refusal of one condemned to death, who knows he is lost, t is not resigned to his fate. Existence thus presents itself as man's nstant and despairing presence to himself in the incomprehensible, a bellious presence, carried over into the entire breadth of individual perience. But then, is not the last word of existence "to feel one's e, one's rebellion, and one's liberty as much as possible"? And that thout any purpose, without any constraint! "Everything is allowed." o matter how much Camus adds that this does not mean that nothing

is forbidden, we are not satisfied. In spite of all he says, is not his attitude still a kind of suicide?

It has been said that though Albert Camus does not leap out of the absurd, he does not remain quiet in it. He thus gives evidence of a dynamism which should carry him far beyond, but which instead wears itself out where it is. This same dynamism makes him interested in man; all the more interested, he himself tells us, as man appears to him ridiculous and humiliated, since this miserable and forever threatened situation is what gives its meaning to human existence, the brotherhood, to friendship: "These are the true riches, since they are perishable."

He is even concerned with establishing a morality, but a morality which man draws from himself and from himself alone, a morality altogether at man's service. "No, everything is not summarized in negation or in absurdity. That we know." Thus he writes in the periodical *Combat*. The whole question is to know whether man can create his own values without any help from "grace" or from rationalistic thought.

Addressing himself to young people[12] he goes so far as to say:

> We know that we are in the midst of a contradiction, but we must refuse the contradiction and do whatever must be done to reduce it. . . . Let us remain strong in spirit, even though force, to seduce us, assume the appearance of an idea or the appeal of comfort. The first thing is not to despair. . . . If we wish to save the spirit, we must ignore its weakling virtues and exalt its powers of conquest. . . . But where are the conquering virtues of the spirit? For Nietzsche, these are strength of character, the spirit and taste, the "world," classic happiness, intransigent pride, the cold frugality of the wise man. Nietzsche, it is true, adds eccentric license. But we have since understood that this virtue concealed too much self-complacence.

Camus, for his part, insists on strength of character. "I am not speaking of that type which, on the electioneering stump, goes with knitting brows and threats, but of that which resists every wind of the sea by the power of whiteness and of the sap." Such is the fragile snow on the almond trees of the Valley of the Consuls in Algiers, which, resisting all the rains and the sea gales, remains every year as long as is necessary to prepare the fruit. In this way will our fruit prepare itself in the midst of the winter of the world.

How can we fail to be touched by the deeply sincere and human note in these words? But in spite of that how can we escape feeling ill at ease when we remember that Albert Camus has also said: "If all experiences are indifferent, the experience of duty is just as legitimate as another." Does he really think he can restore morality in that way?[13]

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[12] *Le Courrier de l'étudiant*, November 1, 1945.

[13] Concerning Albert Camus, cf. Jean du Rostu, "Un Pascal sans Christ: Albert Camus," *Etudes*, October and November, 1945.

GABRIEL MARCEL

M. Gabriel Marcel, from his own statement, would have liked to mpose a logically connected treatise, but having, as he says, the nelancholy assurance" that he will never write it, he contents himself th offering us "meditations dramatic or, perhaps more exactly, musical their essence"; that is, variations on a theme furnished on the casion of concrete situations which concern man's destiny.

The most frequent themes are commitment, faithfulness, witness, d especially, hope, all evidently quite in opposition to the philosophies st presented. However, the method is clearly that of the existentialist. e are told that it consists in "making an appeal to a certain experience ich must be supposed present in all to whom one addresses himself"; d then, somehow, in purifying that experience, "or, more exactly, in ssing from the diluted or distended state of the experience to the perience actually achieved—I do not say absolutely conceived—in its ghest tension, or even to its supreme point of saturation."[14] The estion then is not to demonstrate, but to show, and, while remaining the interior of an experience supposed to be common, to penetrate more deeply, and to grasp it in its pure state.

Gabriel Marcel's idea of experience is not the same as that of Jean-aul Sartre—an ephemeral act, isolated from all else, closed in the rrow circle of immanence, yet nevertheless proudly satisfied with what is, which is its nothingness. Marcel, on the contrary, is convinced at there can be no full consciousness of the situation which makes us istents without the appearance of the fundamental data implied by is situation, most of all, its transcendence.

There must be being. This, in me, is an aspiration, an exigency hich cannot be denied. To affirm being is to accept my being involved being and toward being; it is a question of faithfulness to myself. ow, I perceive that

> at the limit, there would exist an absolute involvement contracted by the totality of myself, or at least by a reality of myself, which could not be disowned without a total disowning, and which would on the other hand address itself to the totality of being and would be taken in presence of this totality itself.[15]

Iarcel says and repeats: "No philosophy of existence can establish self without reference to the transcendent, and the idea of this anscendence cannot be laicized. Its true name is not nature, or manity, or thought, but God. Besides, faithfulness can exist only regard to a person.[16]

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[14] *Homo Viator,* p. 39.

[15] *Etre et avoir,* p. 63.

[16] These ideas were previously expressed in the course of a discussion held n years ago before the Société Française de Philosophie. (Cf. *Bulletin,* 1937,

The experience of the existent, therefore, has always some eleme of the "mysterious," in the peculiar meaning of the word as used b our author, who, as we know, carefully distinguishes between *problem* and *mysteries*. There are indeed, as he tells us, realities which a exterior to us and which we can consider as such. We strive to esta lish some link among these realities so that we may order them accordi to the exigencies of our thought. A *problem* is thus proposed. interests us, as it were, but only superficially, without commanding o entire attention. This is the field of the sciences, of objective know edge. But when the reality considered is so closely bound and cemente to my essential nature that I cannot separate it or place it before m as an object without falsifying and mutilating myself, when I cannot ma abstraction from myself, then I am dealing with a mystery. Nothi can be more truly interesting than this, for it is no longer a matter "solving a question," but of acquiring full consciousness of realit in which I am vitally engaged by reason of the very fact that I a Existence is not a problem, but a mystery.

Whenever man attempts to think his life, he inevitably looks up it as a path along which others have gone with him, at least for a tim a path which has been trod and which stretches ahead into the futur A future? But by what authority does this traveler continue his jou neying into a region where the stages are no longer observable? Mar answers that "it is precisely here that hope has the opportunity for full exercise."

At the root of hope we find existence experienced as a "captivity an "alienation," an adversity, a suffering and darkened existence, a this is what gives hope its irreducible dramatic character, any abstracti of which will "devitalize" hope itself.

The man who hopes does not let himself be paralyzed by this sta of trial which is the common lot of all. Why? Is it because he h some vague feeling that things are bound to come out well in the en or because he trusts his own insight and ability? This would only the sign of a kind of superficial optimism which looks upon the dif cult circumstances of life, seen in their outward aspects only, as problem whose solution is comparatively easy for anyone not total bereft of the means of solving it. The man who hopes knows and fee himself as altogether involved in the painful situations of existenc but he does not suffer himself to be dominated by these contrary forc which have already penetrated his being, by the interior determinis

pp. 172-92.) They are repeated in *Etre et avoir*, and in G. Marcel's most rece work, *Homo Viator, Prolégomènes à une métaphysique de l'espérance* (Aubi 1945).

ther similar to an attack of cramps," which carries a threat of alysis.

He does not surrender, and yet his nonacceptance is not a rebellion is that of Albert Camus. In hope there is no stiffening out, no sing, no tightening, but rather an element of relaxation. How can s be? The stoic, while looking at the inevitable with open eyes, ds means of strengthening himself interiorly. He is strong, but he ses himself up. He acts as one who has no neighbor, who depends y on himself and has responsibility only for himself. He is the hest expression of the "me-I" (*moi je*). Hope, however, does not y on the level of a solitary self, hypnotized on the subject of its indi- ual purposes, satisfied with its own means. Hope relies on another son: and note this well, for it is important: not another thing, but ther person, a personal help.

Hope is impossible for us in proportion as we pay tribute to *to have*, ncentrating our anxious attention on the trumps in our hand or few pawns on our board, feverishly repeating our count in the fear finding ourselves short.

> No doubt it is true in this sense, and in the last analysis, that only those who are completely free from the hampering influence of possession in all its forms are at all able to know the divine light-someness of life in hope.

thout necessarily condemning all possession, which would be tanta- unt to a rash and proud repudiation of all finite existence, we may haps say that

> if we remain, no matter how feebly, permeable to hope, that can be only thanks to the chinks and fissures that are found in the armor of possession which covers us, of the good things we have, our knowledge, our experience, and our virtues even more perhaps than of our vices.[17]

The result is the possibility of a relation quite original in char- er, one which could not be called into doubt without "stripping their distinctive character the highest experiences which men have ught they lived."[18] This relation is not to an object as such, which uld be for me but a spectacle or a problem, but to a mysterious nciple which somehow connives with me, a Thee, to which I am no s mysteriously open, not to reduce him to myself, but to engage self towards him. He is then for me not a thing, but a present son. "Hope is inseparable from an experience of communion,"[19] ommunion both very intimate and very broad.

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[17] *Homo Viator*, pp. 82-83.
[18] *Etre et avoir*, p. 63.
[19] *Homo Viator*, p. 128.

"I hope in Thee for us," might perhaps be taken as the most ad quate and detailed expression of the act of hope. In Thee, becau

> Thou art in some manner the one who guarantees the unity which binds us, myself to myself, or the one to the other, or the ones to the others, as more than the one who guarantees by assuring or confirming a previously constituted unity, as the cement itself which effects that unity.

If such is the case, to despair of Thee is to despair of myself, to despa of us. No doubt there can always be refusal to hope, as there c be refusal to love; but this would involve jeopardizing the entire edifi of human things, which give assurance of solidity only where th are referred to a superhuman order. Here below we can grasp on the indications of this order, as a living "perennialness" which revealed through hope as something that envelops our transitory exis ence, yet can be reached only at its term, at the very end of the journ to which all life is finally reduced.[20]

This is the attitude of soul to which Marcel wants to win us. A by what means? We must repeat that it is not proof of anythi whatsoever; he urges each of us to an experience of "recollectio for the self into which each of us then enters thus appears to him its mystery as a being which does not belong to itself, but which being only inasmuch as it is participated.

Experience of participation, immediate knowledge of our conti gency, which enfolds an ontological exigency: Marcel has good reas to see here the "prolegomena" of a metaphysic. Yet this metaphy can possess its value only in the light of intelligence.

Here precisely is the weak point of existentialism in most of its act forms. It gives evidence of an uncommon degree of penetration i concrete situations and often expresses them admirably. But, as have already mentioned, in its reaction against the excesses of int lectualism, it has come to lose faith in intelligence, and, in order penetrate the domain of existence, to fall back on love. No doubt, t love here considered is distinct from desire and is a love which the answer to an appeal, a going out from oneself, a subordination another whom I truly wish as other in himself, for himself, and n for myself. All of which is very fine! But this love is a choice, t choice of Gabriel Marcel, quite in opposition to the choice of Jean-Pa Sartre; and many a skeptic murmurs: "Sartre's consciousness is pe haps rather different from that of Gabriel Marcel, but the quarrel merely one of temperament." After all, is not Marcel, in his *Jour métaphysique,* the promoter in France of that fashion of philosophi ing which consists in confusing research and the object of researc

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

nd raising the movement of consciousness which aims at truth to the ignity of truth itself?[21]

If in truth this option concerns what is most essential and most ital for all men, it needs must carry with it a universal justification. ove must be shot through with intelligence; it must be a rational ppetite.

The return to the existent being is a fortunate reaction against lealism. What gives cause for alarm in existentialism is the persistent nsideration of the "in-oneself" as beyond all relations and the replica- on of the subject on himself, the mistrust of any notional knowledge, f any deduction, the forgetfulness of the true nature of our intelligence.

If it is true that the mere force of general principles cannot command ne assent of our contemporaries, it would be rash, on the pretext of etting out of the "Scholastic rut," to send "the wayfarers" along the ighway a-seeking adventure beyond the paths of reason.

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21 Cf. Ferdinand Alquié, "L'Etre et le néant," in *Cahiers du sud,* No. 273, . 659. Concerning G. Marcel, cf. Marcel de Corte, *La Philosophie de Gabriel Marcel* (Paris, Téqui).

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal . . ." The familiar, welcome ringing of these words in the ears and memories of Americans, and an interpretation of them that is sometimes a little too literal, may partially explain a rather prevalent tendency to see in the virtue of justice only a habit of making fair exchanges without reference to the persons concerned, or taking it for granted that these persons are fully equal. Again, a well-intentioned but indiscriminate adherence to what are held to be the principles of democracy leads some to think that the ideal situation is one in which the goods of the commonwealth are distributed among the citizens in shares that, if possible, are equal. While the type of justice—called *commutative* by St. Thomas Aquinas—in which the stress is on the *quid pro quo,* or the equality of *things* exchanged, functions on very many occasions, still there is another kind, *distributive* justice, not as well understood or as widely enforced. This sort of justice is brought into play in those external dealings in which the essential point is the inequality of the persons involved, so that the only just procedure consists in giving unequal goods to the unequal individuals. A study of St. Thomas's teaching on distributive justice in his commentary on the fifth book of the *Ethics* of Aristotle (who first developed this theory) and in the *Summa Theologica,*[2] will show in how wide an area this virtue operates, and will bring out some points of application to phases of modern life. While St. Thomas was no specialist in the field of what we now rather vaguely call "social justice," his theory of justice is full of suggestive principles which, if systematically carried out, could do much for the ills of society.

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[1] ". . . sicut Philosophus dicit, in V *Ethic.* (cap. 4), omne superfluum in his quae ad iustitiam pertinent *lucrum,* extenso nomine, vocatur: sicut et omne quod minus est, vocatur *damnum.* Et hoc ideo, quia iustitia prius est exercita, et communius exercetur in voluntariis commutationibus rerum, puta emptione et venditione, in quibus proprie haec nomina dicuntur; et exinde derivantur haec nomina ad omnia circa quae potest esse iustitia. Et eadem ratio est de hoc quod est reddere unicuique quod suum est." St. Thomas Aquinas, *ST,* II-II, 58. 11 ad 3 (ed. Leon.).

[2] *In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum Expositio,* Liber V, ed. Pirotta (Turin: Marietti, 1934); *ST,* II-II, 57-122, especially 57-63. Also see *CG,* III, 139-42.

THE SPECIES OF JUSTICE

Justice, "the habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by constant and perpetual will,"[3] can be divided into two kinds, *general* nd *particular* justice. *General justice* (also called *legal*) is that whereby man's actions are referred directly to the common good,[4] whether these ctions be performed by the agent in relation to himself, to other indiiduals, or to smaller societies within the larger community, or for the enefit of the whole state. Under general justice, the virtuous action f the part (that is, of the agent) contributes to the good of the whole that is, of the community) and of all the other parts of the whole.[5] *'articular justice* directs human actions immediately to the good of ther individuals in so far as what is due to these individuals can be atisfied by external operations of the agent.[6] The word *individual* may e taken as designating a single human being, or a moral person, that s, a group functioning as a responsible unit. Particular justice can tself be divided into two species, *commutative* and *distributive* justice.[7]

[3] "Et si quis vellet eam in debitam formam definitionis reducere, posset sic icere: quod iustitia est habitus secundum quem aliquis constanti et perpetua oluntate ius suum unicuique tribuit.—Et quasi est eadem definitio cum ea, quam 'hilosophus ponit, in V *Ethic.* (cap. 5), dicens quod *iustitia est habitus secundum uem aliquis dicitur operativus secundum electionen iusti.*" *ST,* II-II, 58. 1. The quotations in English are taken from the translation by the English)ominicans.

[4] "Iustitia legalis est specialis virtus secundum suam essentiam, secundum quod espicit commune bonum, ut proprium objectum. . . . Potest tamen quaelibet irtus, secundum quod a praedicta virtute, speciali quidem in essentia, generali utem secundum virtutem, ordinatur ad bonum commune, dici iustitia legalis. t hoc modo loquendi iustitia legalis est idem in essentia cum omni virtute, ffert autem ratione. Et hoc modo loquitur Philosophus." *Ibid.,* 58. 6.

[5] ". . . iustitia legalis est perfecta virtus, quia ille qui habet hanc virtutem, otest uti virtute ad alterum, et non solum ad seipsum." *In V Ethic.,* 2. 908 Marietti).

". . . ille qui servit alicui communitati servit omnibus hominibus qui sub comunitate illa continentur. Ad utrumque igitur se potest habere iustitia secundum ropriam rationem. Manifestum est autem quod omnes qui sub communitate liqua continentur comparantur ad communitatem sicut partes ad totum. Pars utem id quod est totius est: unde et quodlibet bonum partis est ordinabile in onum totius. Secundum hoc igitur bonum cuiuslibet virtutis, sive ordinantis iquem hominem ad seipsum, sive ordinantis ipsum ad aliquas alias personas ngulares, est referibile ad bonum commune, ad quod ordinat iustitia." *ST,* I-II, 58. 5.

[6] "Cum iustitia ordinetur ad alterum, non est circa totam materiam virtutis oralis, sed solum circa exteriores actiones et res secundum quamdam rationem biecti specialem, prout scilicet secundum eas unus homo alteri coordinatur." *T,* II-II, 58. 8.

[7] "Iustitia particularis ordinatur ad aliquam privatam personam, quae comaratur ad communitatem sicut pars ad totum. Potest autem ad aliquam partem uplex ordo attendi. Unus quidem partis ad partem: cui similis est ordo unius rivatae personae ad aliam. Et hunc ordinem dirigit commutativa iustitia, quae nsistit in his quae mutuo fiunt inter duas personas ad invicem. Alius ordo

Commutative justice is concerned with the mutual dealings between two persons, while *distributive justice* directs the order whereby that which belongs to the community is apportioned among the members. These two types of justice differ further in that they render different kinds of due, private property being due to an individual in one way and common property in another.[8] In both cases an equality must be established, for it is of the very nature of justice to reduce unequal things to equality.[9] In commutative justice this equality is produced according to arithmetical proportion, through the exact exchange of one equal thing with another, directly by barter or indirectly through a monetary medium.[10] Quite different is the equality of distributive justice. The distribution of common property is to be made on the basis of the

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attenditur totius ad partes: et huic ordini assimilatur ordo eius quod est commune ad singulas personas. Quem quidem ordinem dirigit iustitia distributiva, quae est distributiva communium secundum proportionalitatem. Et ideo duae sunt iustitiae species: scilicet distributiva et commutativa." *Ibid.*, 61. 1.

"*Primo ponit* [*Philosophus*] *unam speciem particularis iustitiae.* Et dicit quod una species eius . . . est illa, quae consistit in distributionibus aliquorum communium, quae sunt dividenda inter eos qui communicant civili communicatione. . . . *Ponit secundam speciem particularis iustitiae.* Et dicit, quod una alia species particularis iustitiae est, quae constituit rectitudinem iustitiae in commutationibus, secundum quas transfertur aliquid ab uno in alterum; sicut prima species iustitiae attendebatur secundum quod transfertur aliquid a communi ad singulos." *In V Ethic.*, 4. 927-28.

[8] ". . . iustitia distributiva et commutativa non solum distinguuntur secundum unum et multa, sed secundum diversam rationem debiti: alio enim modo debetur alicui id quod est commune, alio modo id quod est proprium." *ST*, II-II, 61. 1 ad 5.

"Ce qu'on doit aux individus, comme individus, et ce qu'on doit aux individus en tant que membres du groupe doit se distinguer comme se distinguent les individus et le groupe. Or, pour saint Thomas, il faut le répéter, l'individu et le groupe ne se distinguent pas uniquement comme l'un et le multiple; le groupe comme tel, est quelque chose de nouveau, de spécifique: donc aussi ce qui lui est du; donc aussi ce qui est du à ses membres en tant qu'ils sont ses membres. Ce qu'on doit à un particulier, c'est à lui, simplement, qu'on le doit. Ce qu'on doit à un citoyen comme tel, c'est à la cité, en lui, que cela est du. Dans le premier cas, on argue du bien propre; dans le second, du bien commun. Le titre est différent, donc aussi le devoir, et, ultérieurement, la vertu qui le commande." A.-D. Sertillanges, *La Philosophie morale de s. Thomas d'Aquin*, p. 247.

[9] ". . . ad iustitiam pertinet inaequalia ad aequalitatem reducere." *In VIII Ethic.*, 7. 1632.

"Iustitiae proprium est inter alias virtutes ut ordinet hominem in his quae sunt ad alterum. Importat enim aequalitatem quamdam, ut ipsum nomen demonstrat: dicuntur enim vulgariter ea quae adaequantur *iustari*, aequalitas autem ad alterum est." *ST*, II-II, 57. 1.

[10] ". . . in commutativa iustitia, medium accipitur non quidem secundum geometricam proportionalitatem, quae consistit in aequalitate proportionis, sed secundum arithmeticam, quae consistit in aequalitate quantitatis. . . . circa iustitiam commutativam, semper quidem oportet esse aequalitatem rei ad rem." *In V Ethic.*, 8. 972.

importance of the recipients to the community.[11] The mean of justice here aims to establish a proportion between things and persons, so that this may be called geometrical proportion. Unequal shares are to be given to unequal persons in such a way that the ratio between one share and its recipient is equivalent to the ratio between the other share and the other recipient. Equality, which is essential to justice, is thus maintained in that each party has been given all that he has merited. It is evident that the exercise of this kind of justice requires at least four terms, two human beings and two awards to be given; but it may, of course, be extended to as many other people as are required, provided that there be a corresponding number of shares.[12] St. Thomas gives the following example: if Socrates has worked two days and Plato one day, then if Socrates receives two pounds (*duae librae*), Plato should receive only one pound.[13] So whether you say, Socrates :

"Circa quod considerandum est, quod si semper homines in praesenti indigerent rebus quas invicem habent, non oporteret fieri commutationem nisi rei ad rem, puta frumenti ad vinum: sed quandoque contingit quod ille cui superabundat vinum ad praesens non indiget frumento quod habet ille qui indiget vino, sed forte postea indigebit vel aliqua alia re. Sic ergo pro necessitate futurae commutationis numisma, id est denarius, est nobis quasi fideiussor quod si in praesenti homo nullo indiget sed indigeat in futuro, aderit sibi afferenti denarium illud quo indigebit." *Ibid.*, 9. 986.

". . . in commutationibus redditur aliquid alicui singulari personae propter rem eius, quae accepta est: ut maxime patet in emptione et venditione, in quibus primo invenitur ratio commutationis. Et ideo oportet adaequare rem rei: ut quanto plus iste habet quam suum sit de eo quod est alterius, tantumdem restituat ei cuius est. Et sic fit aequalitas secundum *arithmeticam* medietatem, quae attenditur secundum parem quantitatis excessum." *ST*, II-II, 61. 2.

[11] ". . . ex ratione dignitatis manifestum est, quod iustum consistit in quadam proportionalitate. Sic enim aliquid dicitur esse iustum in distributionibus, inquantum unicuique datur secundum dignitatem, prout cuique dignum est dari. In quo designatur proportionalitas quaedam; ut scilicet ita hoc sit dignum uni sicut aliud est dignum alteri." *In V Ethic.*, 4. 936.

". . . in distributiva iustitia datur aliquid alicui privatae personae in quantum id quod est totius, est debitum parti. Quod quidem tanto maius est quanto ipsa pars maiorem principalitatem habet in toto. Et ideo in distributiva iustitia tanto plus alicui de bonis communibus datur quanto illa persona habet principalitatem in communitate. . . . ut scilicet, sicut una persona excedit aliam, ita etiam res quae datur uni personae, excedit rem quae datur alii." *ST*, II-II, 61. 2.

"Devoir à quelqu'un selon qu'il est partie d'un tout, c'est lui devoir selon ce qu'il représente de ce tout, selon sa valeur à l'égard de l'ensemble et de ce qui en constitue l'essence." Sertillanges, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

[12] ". . . sicut proportionalitas, ita et iustum ad minus in quatuor invenitur, in quibus attenditur eadem proportio; quia scilicet secundum eamdem proportionem dividuntur res quae distribuuntur et personae quibus distribuuntur." *In V Ethic.*, 5. 941.

Also see *ST*, II-II, 61. 2 *passim*.

[13] "Sit ergo A unus terminus, puta duae librae: B autem sit una libra, G autem sit una persona, puta Socratis qui duobus diebus laboravit. D autem sit Plato qui uno die laboravit. Sicut ergo se habet A ad B, ita se habet G ad D, quia utrobique invenitur dupla proportio: ergo permutatim sicut se habet A ad G,

Plato :: 2 pounds : 1 pound, or Socrates : 2 pounds :: Plato : 1 pound, equality is established because the first ratio is equal to the second. This is at first sight a somewhat puzzling example, because the payment of wages is usually thought to fall under commutative justice; but the emphasis here is laid rather on Socrates as a hard worker and on Plato as not so diligent a worker, so that the inequality of persons, a necessary prerequisite for distributive justice, is present.[14] It may well be, too, that the payment of a single individual may be regulated by commutative justice, whereas the comparison between two or more persons may bring a transaction, at least from one aspect, within the province of distributive justice. To sum up in the words of St. Thomas:

> . . . in distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things and persons: in such a way that even as one person surpasses another, so that which is given to one person surpasses that which is allotted to another. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* v.3,4) that the mean in the latter case follows geometrical proportion, wherein equality depends not on quantity but on proportion.[15]

It should be remembered that the worth of the persons in question is evaluated according to their station in the distributing society. The proportion can then be set up in general terms:

$$\frac{\text{A person of greater value to society}}{\text{A larger share of some good}} :: \frac{\text{Another person of less value to society}}{\text{A smaller share of the same good}}$$

Of course the kind of good distributed and the size of the shares should bear a direct relation to the sort of worth attributed to the persons: for example, military honors should go to good soldiers and scholastic

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ita B ad D. . . . Sic ergo et permutatim erit verum dicere, quod sicut se habet A ad G, idest duae librae ad eum qui duobus diebus laboravit, ita B ad D, idest una libra ad eum qui uno die laboravit." *In V Ethic.*, 5. 941.

The example of two workers, but with no names mentioned, can be found in Aristotle *Magna Moralia* i. 34. 1194a.

[14] "Et oportet ad rationem iustitiae, quod sit eadem aequalitas personarum quibus fit iustitia et rerum in quibus fit: ut scilicet sicut se habent res ad invicem, ita et personae: alioquin non habebunt aequalia sibi. Sed ex hoc fiunt pugnae et accusationes quasi sit iustitia praetermissa; quia vel aequales non recipiunt aequalia in distributione bonorum communium, vel non aequalibus dantur aequa: puta si inaequaliter laborantibus dantur aequalia stipendia, vel aequaliter laborantibus dantur inaequalia." *In V Ethic.*, 4. 935.

[15] "In iustitia distributiva non accipitur medium secundum aequalitatem rei ad rem, sed secundum proportionem rerum ad personas: ut scilicet, sicut una persona excedit aliam, ita etiam res quae datur uni personae excedat rem quae datur alii. Et ideo dicit Philosophus quod tale medium est secundum *geometricam proportionalitatem*, in qua attenditur aequale non secundum quantitatem, sed secundum proportionem." *ST*, II-II, 61. 2.

wards to earnest students, not vice versa. It is then clear that commutative and distributive justice differ from one another in that *a*) the rst renders something to one person and the latter at least to two;) private property is due to a man in one way and common property another; *c*) in the one we find equality of arithmetical proportion nd in the other equality of geometrical proportion; and *d*) in commutative justice the equality of things is considered, while in distributive ustice an inequality of persons is reduced to equality by proper apportonment of shares. The consideration of persons is not entirely excluded rom commutative justice; but in distributive justice a person's station considered in itself, and in the other kind only as it causes a diversity things themselves. To strike a prince is in itself worse than to strike n ordinary citizen[16] and receives severer punishment.

THE EXERCISE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Who should exercise distributive justice? Distributive justice is that hich distributes the common goods of a society among the members ccording to their merit.[17] Now,

> the act of distributing the goods of the community belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those goods; and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those goods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a just distribution.[18]

On the whole this is a virtue for superiors of various types of society, ivil, domestic, industrial, and others; it is not, however, a virtue for few only. Almost everyone is a superior, either in a primary or elegated sense, and the notion might even be stretched to take in nyone who has something to give, for in that respect he is the superior

[16] ". . . in actionibus et passionibus conditio personae facit ad quantitatem ei: . . . Et ita conditio personae in distributiva iustitia attenditur secundum e: in commutativa autem secundum quod per hoc diversificatur res." *Ibid.*, ad 3. ". . . iniuria illata aliam proportionem habet ad principem, et aliam ad perpnam privatam. Et ideo oportet aliter adaequare utramque iniuriam per indictam." *Ibid.*, 58. 10 ad 3.

"La différence que veut établir saint Thomas entre la justice des échanges ndividuels et la justice des répartitions sociales ne git donc pas en ce que ces ernières n'ont égard qu'aux personnes et les autres aux choses. Personnes choses interviennent ici et là. Mais en justice de répartition, les personnes nterviennent à titre direct; les choses uniquement en tant que signe, effet ou oncomitant de la qualité sociale des personnes. Au contraire, en justice échange, ce qui intervient à titre direct, ce sont des *choses,* c'est-à-dire des éalités matérielles ou des actes, et les personnes ne sont envisagées que comme ément déterminateur de ces choses." Sertillanges, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

[17] *ST*, II-II, 61. 1. See n. 7 above.

[18] "Actus distributionis quae est communium bonorum pertinet solum ad raesidentem communibus bonis: sed tamen iustitia distributiva est etiam in ibditis, quibus distribuitur, inquantum scilicet sunt contenti iusta distributione." *id.*, ad 3.

of the person who has not that something.[19] In an analogous sense the principles of distributive justice may be applied even in the area of the virtues annexed to justice, such as piety, observance, and gratitude, whose expression is conditioned both in quantity and quality by the worth of the recipient. Strictly speaking, however, distributive justice is exercised within the framework of an organized society, by the superior in distributing and by the subject in acquiescing in the arrangements made. For instance, under a selective service law, the state can by distributive justice call up fit candidates for military training and assign positions suitable to each. The soldiers exercise distributive justice by answering the summons and accepting the rank assigned. At the same time both rulers and subjects are contributing to the common good and thus also exercising general justice. Or if, as may happen in small communities, the upkeep of roads depends upon the members of the group, the men who willingly do their part are acting according to the virtue of justice in its distributive as well as its general aspect.

Towards whom should this virtue be directed? It is practiced in regard to persons considered as holding a certain rank in the group whose goods are to be awarded. St. Thomas gives the example of civic honors being distributed in an aristocracy on the basis of virtue, in an oligarchy on the basis of wealth, in a democracy on the basis of freedom for these qualities—virtue, wealth, and freedom—are of the very life stuff of their respective commonwealths.[20] The type of goods in question must be apportioned in such a way that some condition of the recipient is a true and valid cause of the distribution, and that the more truly this condition is verified in each candidate, the larger will be his

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[19] "Etiam distributio quandoque fiat bonorum communium non quidem civitati sed uni familiae: quorum distributio fieri potest auctoritate alicuius privatae personae." *Ibid.*

"La justice distributive est exercée par les chefs ou par les particuliers en tant qu'ils acceptent l'action des chefs ou juoent eux-mêmes, à l'égard d'un groupe enclavé dans le premier, le rôle de chefs." Sertillanges, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

Distributive justice must be clearly distinguished from liberality. The liberal man gives of what is really his own and to whom he pleases. The man who distributes does so out of goods of which he is only the steward and upon which other people have a claim of some kind, the exact extent of which it is the administrator's duty to determine as prudently as possible. "Duplex est datio. Una quidem pertinens ad iustitiam, qua scilicet gratis datur alicui quod ei debetur. Et circa tales dationes attenditur personarum acceptio. Alia est datio ad liberalitatem pertinens, qua scilicet gratis datur alicui quod ei non debetur." *ST*, II-II, 63. 1 ad 3.

[20] ". . . principalitas in aristocratica communitate attenditur secundum virtutem, in oligarchica secundum divitias, in democratica secundum libertatem, et in aliis aliter." *ST*, II-II, 61. 2.

Also see *In V Ethic.*, 4. 937.

nare.[21] Hence the vice which is directly opposed to distributive justice called "respect of persons," and consists in awarding goods in virtue f some condition of the recipient which does not amount to a valid title, r in not adjusting shares according to merit, that is, quantitatively.[22]

What kinds of things can be distributed? Public burdens and respon- bilities, rewards and honors, opportunities and helps, common funds, nd even punishments—but all these over and above the strict claims of ommutative justice; also, in a negative way, distributive justice func- ons in the refraining from placing unjust burdens—for instance, taxes— n any particular section of the country.

> Distributive justice inclines a ruler as representing the whole of society to distribute the *public* goods, such as public money, political honors, positions in the public service, etc., in a just manner, without favouritism, and without injury to the common good.[23]

BURDENS

Consider the matter of burdens. Members of a society have the uty, and therefore the right, of contributing to the welfare of that ociety; this normally entails the bearing of a share of the work or ther responsibilities involved. Here superiors may exercise the duty f distribution in either of two ways, by actual appointment or by remov- ng hindrances in the path of those who have formulated their own egitimate plans for useful social action. The heads of social groups nust endeavor, in allotting positions, to give them to people according o their ability, taking into account the elements of talent, training, trength, and time; it is unjust to overburden people, if it can be elped, and, by the same token, it is unfair not to give them sufficient hance to place their gifts at the disposal of the group, if this is at all

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21 "Consistit enim aequalitas distributivae iustitiae in hoc quod diversis personis iversa tribuuntur secundum proportionem ad dignitates personarum." *ST*, I-II, 63. 1.

22 ". . . in distributiva iustitia considerantur conditiones personarum quae aciunt ad causam dignitatis vel debiti. Sed in acceptione personarum con- iderantur conditiones quae non faciunt ad causam." *Ibid.*, ad 1.

". . . personae proportionantur et dignae redduntur aliquibus quae eis dis- ribuuntur, propter aliquas res quae pertinent ad conditionem personae: et ideo uiusmodi conditiones sunt attendendae tamquam propriae causae. Cum autem onsiderantur ipsae personae, attenditur non causa ut causa. Et ideo patet uod quamvis personae sint digniores simpliciter, non tamen sunt digniores quoad oc." *Ibid.*, ad 2.

23 Cronin, Michael, *The Science of Ethics* (New York: Benziger), II, 80-81. ". . . una species eius [iustitiae], et similiter iusti, quod secundum ipsam dicitur, st illa, quae consistit in distributionibus aliquorum communium, quae sunt ividenda inter eos qui communicant civili communicatione: sive sit honor, ive sit pecunia, vel quicquid aliud ad bona exteriora pertinens, vel etiam ad ala; sicut labor, expensae, et similia." *In V Ethic.*, 4. 927. (Permission to uote from *The Science of Ethics* has kindly been granted by the publisher.)

possible. In a democracy, the "superior" in the case may be the whole electorate, although even in democracies, an aristocratic note is present when, for instance, the president appoints a cabinet. If the head of the state should choose officers for other reasons than their fitness for office—and that with eyes deliberately on something else in these men—he is guilty of "repect of persons."[24] Thus "government by personal friends" or the "spoils system" is hardly justifiable, unless the men so appointed happen to be as well equipped as any in the field and can furthermore be trusted because of ties of blood or friendship. This is very much what St. Thomas says in regard to the matter of appointing relatives to ecclesiastical benefices in the middle ages.[25] He also takes care to point out that the man chosen for a certain office need not be absolutely the best, so long as he is quite capable, for sometimes less virtue may be combined with greater administrative ability or very helpful prestige.[26] The classic example in history where saintliness alone was not able to make a man a capable pope, though that of all offices ought to be awarded to men of virtue, is that of Pope St. Peter Celestine. Our modern habit of appointing great soldiers, writers, or scientists to high public posts—especially, it appears, to that of ambassador—again needs some explaining. If it is based on the same quirk of public psychology which makes us accept a man learned in one field as an oracle in all others, as when a scientist is allowed to demolish metaphysics with one sweeping statement, why then, we are

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[24] See n. 22 above. As Etienne Gilson says in *Moral Values and the Moral Life*, trans. by Leo R. Ward, pp. 252-53: "The basic principle of distributive justice consists in giving to every member of a group the share of things that is coming to him according to his place in the group. But human respect, or respect of persons, begins to vitiate shares every time we let some other line of demarcation than this rule decide the part going to each individual.

". . . Here we may define 'person' in a general way as being: any other condition than the legitimate cause for the attribution of a good in question." (Permission to quote from *Moral Values and the Moral Life* has kindly been granted by the publisher, the B. Herder Book Company.)

[25] ". . . quandoque vero consanguinei praelati ecclesiastici sunt aeque digni ut alii. Et sic licite potest, absque personarum acceptione, consanguineos suos praeferre; quia saltem in hoc praeeminent, quod de ipsis magis confidere potest ut unanimiter secum negotia ecclesiae tractent." *ST*, II-II, 63. 2 ad 1.

[26] ". . . contingit enim quandoque quod ille qui est minus sanctus et minus sciens, potest magis conferre ad bonum commune, propter potentiam vel industriam saecularem, vel propter aliquid huiusmodi." *Ibid.*, 63. 2c.

". . . sufficit eligere bonum, nec oportet eligere meliorem: quia sic omnis electio posset habere calumniam. Sed quantum ad conscientiam eligentis, necesse est eligere meliorem vel simpliciter, vel in comparatione ad bonum commune. Quia si potest haberi aliquis magis idoneus erga aliquam dignitatem, et alius praeferatur, oportet quod hoc sit propter aliquam causam. Quae quidem si pertineat ad negotium, quantum ad hoc erit ille qui eligitur magis idoneus." *Ibid.*, ad 3.

not acting according to justice in our choice of representatives abroad. But if our appointees are reasonably qualified, the added halo of renown mentioned above may be a great help to them in their work. Although St. Thomas does not discuss this question, it would seem proper sometimes to appoint people known to be gifted but lacking in experience, say on account of youth, instead of more seasoned individuals; for one of the most valuable forms of training is that secured *sur le champs,* and in view of the need for continually replacing public officials this procedure could be justified. Of course no one would advocate following it with regard to the most important positions. It may be noticed that in some ways distributive justice is conditioned by legal justice; it is true that from one aspect a matter may fall under distributive justice and from another under a different form of justice. It is also true that the discussion of burdens seems almost to have become a discussion of honors; but here we are dealing with the subject of public charges or plain, prosaic jobs just in so far as they are onerous, rather than enjoyable or honorable.

The imposition of taxes involves the laying of financial burdens in a properly distributive way upon the members of a state; the same is true of various collections and dues in other kinds of groups. In the first case, distributive justice not only makes it fair to take more of a rich man's money in actual dollars than of a poor man's, but also justifies a progressive tax which will ensure the equality of a geometric proportion.

> In order to impose equal sacrifices we must tax the richer man, not only absolutely, but relatively more than the poor man. The taxes must be not proportional but progressive; the rate must be lower in the one case than the other.[27]

HONORS

Because, in man's present condition, work is a source of satisfaction as well as a penalty, the matter of burdens is closely associated with related questions of honors and opportunities of obtaining them. Responsibilities ought, under distributive justice, to be imposed in such a way that those who assume them may concomitantly be enabled to develop and display their best possibilities, and that the richer opportunities should be opened to those of greater ability.

> Society . . . is to be measured and evaluated by the opportunities

[27] Seligman, R. A., *Progressive Taxation* (Princeton, 1908), p. 211, quoted by John A. Ryan in *Distributive Justice* (New York: Macmillan, 1942), p. 228. (Permission to quote from *Distributive Justice* has kindly been granted by the publisher.)

> it gives a man for living his individual life more fully, by the help it offers him to perfect himself.[28]

Superiors of any kind—in the state, religious orders, families, or schools—should not try to level people off too much. For instance, mistakes are sometimes made in the field of education on the assumption, seemingly, that democratic equality demands that all people must be trained alike; yet it would be more really democratic and more according to distributive justice, as a matter of fact, to adjust programs of studies carefully according to the abilities of students, the minimum fundamentals being safeguarded for everyone. Those who take opportunities that they do not need may be unjust; while people should be free to find useful work, they have no right to a paying position that they do not need and someone else does. Taking a salaried position merely to keep busy may be at least a minor way of disrupting the pattern of distributive justice; likewise, those who do the hiring should do their best to arrange wage-paying positions for those who need them. Other people, to whom money is no real object, can expend their energies in other useful ways. So much for the question of opportunities.

Honors are closely linked with responsibilities; one is honored by being appointed to a special place in the community, although this at the same time involves hard work. St. Thomas threshes out the whole question of the awarding of honors under the heading "Of Respect of Persons."[29] This is the vice opposed to distributive justice (although the obverse can also be considered a vice; we might label "disrespect of persons" the tendency to underestimate people and hence pass them by). Respect of persons fails to observe due proportion between the things distributed and the worth of the persons to whom they are issued. All sorts of favoritism, partiality, and jobbery are opposed to distributive justice. St. Thomas's examples[30] are that of the professor appointed to a chair for reasons of his wealth or relationship to someone, whereas learning should be the only proper cause, and that of a high

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[28] Farrel, Walter, O.P., *Companion to the Summa,* III (New York: Sheed, 1940), 187.

[29] *ST,* II-II, 63.

[30] "Ad personam autem refertur quaecumque conditio non faciens ad causam propter quam sit dignus hoc dono: puta si aliquis promoveat aliquem ad praelationem vel magisterium quia est dives, vel quia est consanguineus suus, est acceptio personae. Contingit tamen aliquam conditionem personae facere eam dignam respectu unius rei, et non respectu alterius: sicut consanguinitas facit aliquem dignum ad hoc quod instituatur haeres patrimonii, non autem ad hoc quod conferatur ei praelatio ecclesiastica. Et ideo eadem conditio personae in uno negotio considerata facit acceptionem personae, in alio autem non facit." *Ibid.,* 63. 1.

ecclesiastic receiving his benefice on grounds of consanguinity, whereas virtue and administrative ability should alone be considered. So honors should be awarded only on the basis of fitness and worth.

Honors can also be taken to mean deferential attentions, once persons are promoted to office. Here St. Thomas points out that it is quite legitimate to honor a person, not so much for his personal qualities, as for what he represents, as when we show respect to a minister of God, not for his own goodness, which may be lacking, but for the goodness of God, for whom he stands.[31] Honors and rewards are paid over and above the just remuneration required by commutative justice.

> When a man who has served the community is paid for his services, that is to be referred to commutative, not distributive justice.[32]

Such extras as the awarding of honorary degrees, special gifts, dedications of books, and particular military salutes come under distributive justice in that they are paid to people in virtue of their superior worth and position, although from another point of view these attentions fall under some of the quasi-potential parts of justice, such as observance, piety, gratitude. With regard to school awards, it is probably true to say that actual grades and diplomas or certificates are granted in virtue of commutative justice, whereas medals, prizes, and scholarships are a matter of distributive justice.

PUNISHMENTS

The question of punishments is perhaps most difficult of all to settle, that is, to place properly as belonging to commutative or distributive justice. St. Thomas observes:

> The equality of distributive justice consists in giving unequal things to those who are unequal among themselves. Consequently the requital by punishments and rewards would not be just, were all rewards and punishments equal. . . . Not only do men need to be drawn to good things, and withdrawn from evil, but also good men need to be enticed to better, and wicked men withdrawn from worse

[31] St. Thomas extends this principle to parents and masters, venerable elders, and the rich if wealth really adds to their dignity: ". . . principes et praelati honorantur etiamsi sint mali, inquantum gerunt personam Dei et communitatis cui praeficiuntur. . . . ita etiam honoratur insipiens, quia ponitur loco Dei, et loco totius communitatis.—Et eadem ratione parentes et domini sunt honorandi, propter participationem divinae dignitatis, qui est omnium Pater et Dominus.—Senes autem sunt honorandi propter signum virtutis, quod est senectus: licet hoc signum quandoque deficiat. . . . Divites autem honorandi sunt propter hoc quod maiorem locum in communitatibus obtinent. *Si autem solum intuitu divitiarum honorentur, erit peccatum acceptionis personarum.*" *Ibid.*, 63. 3. (Italics mine.)

[32] ". . . si alicui qui communitati servisset retribueretur aliquid pro servitio impenso, non esset hoc distributivae iustitiae, sed commutativae." *Ibid.*, a. 4 ad 2.

> things. But this would not be the case were rewards and punishments equal . . . . there must needs be a difference in punishments and rewards corresponding to the difference of good and evil deeds.[33]

Furthermore, some criminals commit *more* wicked deeds and others *worse* deeds than others; and punishments should vary accordingly. I do not think, however, that St. Thomas means to say that all punishments are a matter of distributive justice. He says elsewhere that punishment, in so far as it is the concern of public justice, is an act of commutative justice.[34] More light is thrown on the matter by the remark that punishment may be considered in two ways: under its formal aspect, in that it restores the equality of justice by exactly meeting the evil of the *act* (this would be a commutation); and secondly as a medicine which is meant for the good of the person punished and therefore made lighter or heavier than the case itself would appear to warrant.[35] Three times he discusses the objection that a heavier punishment is inflicted upon one who injures the person of a prince than upon one who injures the person of others. St. Thomas's answer is that this case does *not* fall under distributive justice, because the difference in the persons killed here causes a difference in the crime itself; so the heavier punishment is given to meet a worse *crime* rather than to chastise a worse *person*. "Hence in distributive justice a person's station is considered in itself, whereas in commutative justice it is considered in so far as it causes a diversity of things."[36] Justice that simply considers the magnitude of the crime and punishes accordingly is commutative; justice that punishes the individual out of apparent proportion to the crime itself may be either deterrent or corrective. If deterrent, such punishment is probably most closely related to legal justice; if

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[33] "Talis est aequalitas distributivae iustitiae, ut inaequalia inaequalibus reddantur. Non ergo esset iusta recompensatio per poenas et praemia, si omnia praemia et omnes poenae essent aequales. . . . Oportet autem homines non solum trahi ad bona et retrahi a malis, sed etiam bonos allici ad meliora, et malos retrahi a peioribus. Quod non fieret si praemia et poenae essent aequalia. Oportet igitur et poenas et praemia inaequalia esse. . . . Ergo, secundum diversitatem bonorum operum vel malorum, oportet quod sit diversitas poenarum et praemiorum." *CG*, III, 142 (ed. Leon.).

[34] ". . . punitio peccatorum, secundum quod pertinet ad publicam iustitiam, est actus iustitiae commutativae; . . ." *ST*, II-II, 108. 2 ad 1.

[35] ". . . poena dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo secundum rationem poenae. Et secundum hoc, poena non debetur nisi peccato; quia per poenam reparatur aequalitas. . . .

"Alio modo potest considerari poena inquantum est medicina, non solum sanativa peccati praeteriti, sed etiam praeservativa a peccato futuro et promotiva in aliquod bonum. Et secundum hoc, aliquis interdum punitur . . . " *Ibid.*, 108. 4.

[36] See n. 16 above. Also see: *ST*, II-II, 58.10 ad 3; 61. 2 ad 3; and 63. 4 ad 2. The example of *lèse-majesté* as compared with insult or injury to a private person is also discussed in the commentary on the *Ethics: In V Ethic.*, 8. 968-69.

medicinal or corrective, to distributive justice, although here too the common good will be benefited. If we suppose the crimes of two different men to be evaluated as equal, then any greater leniency or severity shown to one rather than to the other could be justified only by the hope that this varying treatment would effect the same result of reformation in both; or it could be justified by the need of setting up an example to the community. This variation in punishments would then be related to different personal qualities or conditions in the two men and would fall under distributive justice. A clear-cut case would be that in which an adult and a child both committed the same crime in identical circumstances; doubtless the adult would and should receive heavier punishment.

PUBLIC FUNDS AND FAIR WAGES

A very thorny matter is that of the distribution of public funds. Some features of this have already been touched upon, for example, the administration of the part of public money that is devoted to affording educational or vocational opportunities for citizens. Here it may be mentioned that the policy of ignoring denominational schools, which are bearing a large part of the burden of public education and the supporters of which are taxpayers, seems contrary to distributive justice. As a matter of fact, this has been at least partially realized and remedied in some states, Louisiana, for instance. Again, no district and no particular group should be unduly favored in the matter of public works of various kinds, although of course, in practice, it takes much prudence to discern just which are the most valid and urgent claims.

In industrial society, a question that needs careful examination is that of the payment of fair wages. Some ethicians, like Cronin, would make this a matter of commutation only. This is not to sponsor the view that the purely objective character of a worker's product should determine the payment. Rather, the value of the man's work is "the value of the human person, or of his faculties and energies."[37] So it is not the *extrinsic* value of a man's work that is repaid by wages, but its *intrinsic* value.[38]

> The man who gives up his whole labour day to another, puts at the disposal of that other all those energies with which nature has equipped him for the supplying of his own needs [and those of his family]. . . . *The capitalist, therefore, who monopolizes all that father's labour is bound to pay a wage which will admit of the fulfillment of this obligation.*[39]

[37] Cronin, *op. cit.*, p. 345.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 346.
[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 346-47.

Monsignor Ryan asks for practically the same result, but calls it a matter of distributive justice:

> Moreover, the conception of the wage contract as a matter of commutative justice only, is inadequate. The transaction between employer and employee involves other questions of justice than that which arises immediately out of the relation between things exchanged. . . . The employer has obligations of justice, not merely as the receiver of a valuable thing through an onerous contract, but as the *distributor* of the common heritage of nature. . . . For the product out of which he pays wages is not his in the same sense as the personal income out of which he repays a loan.[40]

Furthermore, once all the employees have been thus properly paid and the other parties to production, as capitalists and employers, have received their equitable shares, if there is still surplus profit, some at least of this should go to the workers, and that on a truly distributive basis.

> Superior effort, as measured by unusual will-exertion, is a fundamental rule of justice, and a valid title to exceptional reward. Men who strive harder than the majority of their fellows are ethically deserving of extra compensation. . . . the enforcement of this principle is considerably hindered by the difficulty of discerning such efforts.[41]

All in all, it is probably true to say that the payment of wages cannot always be regulated according to commutative justice, but should sometimes take into account certain personal elements, such as that the wage earner is the head of a family or a more zealous and efficient worker than others. When it comes to the distribution of bonuses and similar extra rewards, it would seem legitimate to consider a worker's worth to his company, not only in terms of quantitative contribution—the amount of work done—but also in terms of qualities that make him a valuable member of industrial society. Seniority may be one of these qualities, although not necessarily, and loyalty another. These things are difficult to evaluate, so that here the exercise of distributive justice will call for consummate prudence.[42] At this juncture St. Thomas's example of Socrates and Plato takes on added point. At any rate, in so far as the varying worth of men to their community, in this case an industrial one, can be estimated, it is quite in accord with the principles of distributive justice also to vary their rewards.

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[40] Ryan, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-80.

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 290-91.

[42] ". . . persons necessarily vary with cases, and . . . a condition that involves respect of persons in a given case may be lawful or even required by justice in another. . . . Still, this is not to say that it is always easy to indicate the point at which this crime [respect of persons] begins, for the right that fixes the individual's share in the group's goods is rarely a simple matter." Gilson-Ward, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-54.

SUMMATION

Distributive justice has thus been seen to function in matters where the inequality of persons is the essential point. By a geometrical proportion, it awards unequal things to unequal persons in such a way that both individuals are fairly treated, the ratio between one person and his share equalling the ratio between the other individual and his portion. It is primarily a virtue to be practiced by the head of a society whose goods are to be distributed, but it is also practiced by the inferiors who acquiesce in the distribution. The things to be apportioned may be classified as honors and burdens, opportunities and responsibilities, rewards and punishments, financial levies and returns. In each act of distributive justice the determining factor is the varying worth of the members of a society in relation to that society and in respect of the particular type of goods undergoing distribution. While St. Thomas gives due consideration both to this species of justice and to commutative justice, the latter has received more prominence in modern times. It is then worth while to study distributive justice and to remark that St. Thomas's thought on this subject is profound, marked by common sense, and elastic enough to admit of interesting and fruitful application to twentieth-century conditions. The question may even be posed whether the claims to consideration of the large and small countries among the United Nations are not capable of adjustment according to the principles of distributive justice.

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ST. THOMAS AND THE *VERBUM:* AN INTERPRETATION

In a recent issue of *Theological Studies,*[1] there appeared an article concerning St. Thomas's doctrine on the *verbum.* It is of interest to Thomistic philosophers as an example of how easily a concatenation of texts from St. Thomas can be made to support a theory he could never have accepted.

St. Thomas writes primarily as a theologian; philosophical problems in the majority of contexts are posed and solved in function of theology. Hence it will not do, in interpreting him philosophically, to string together a series of texts haphazardly chosen without regard for context or ultimate meaning. In the exposition of any doctrine of Thomistic philosophy one must use primarily those passages in which St. Thomas treats the problem fully, in which the separate elements of a solution are united and receive their proper meaning and proportions, and in which otherwise misleading words, phrases, and formulas receive their proper interpretation from the context. Then when one meets these phrases and formulas in scattered *responsa* and in primarily theological contexts where exact philosophical statement is not at a premium because the full solution is supposed, they can and must be given their value in the light of the previously ascertained basic meaning. This is not to say that such *responsa* are not a rich source of Thomistic philosophical doctrine, but simply that they must be constantly interpreted with the total solution in mind; only then can it be clearly seen whether they add new elements, simply restate, or perhaps modify the rigidity of a previous solution. Only thus can they be taken as valid indications of St. Thomas's position. Now the main difficulty with the majority of Father Lonergan's statements under the points discussed in this article is that they are based on texts which are either taken uncritically from such *responsa* or else removed from the context that explains them clearly.

Showing a disdain for "metaphysical mechanics," Father Lonergan interprets St. Thomas on intellection and the *verbum* in terms of "introspective and analytic psychology." His ultimate purpose is to

[1] Bernard Lonergan, S.J., "The Concept of *Verbum* in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Theological Studies,* VII, No. 3 (September, 1946), 349-92.

ast some light on procession in the Trinity by examining the intel-ectual procession in man. "The problem here is twofold: (1) Does *ntelligere* mean understanding? (2) What is understanding both in tself and in its expression?"[2] He decides that *intelligere* does mean to understand," that is, to grasp the definitions, the quiddities of things. This point does not concern us here. In his interpretation of under-tanding and its expression, however, the basic doctrines of Thomistic sychology undergo a strange transformation.

In this article, I intend to remark briefly on Father Lonergan's nterpretation of insight into phantasm, conceptualization, abstraction, nd the concept of being.

THE FUNCTION OF THE PHANTASM IN INTELLECTION

> For human understanding, though *it has its object in the phantasm and knows it in the phantasm,* yet is not content with an object in this state.[3]
>
> Phantasm is to intellect as object to potency, as sensible objects to sense, as color to vision. Phantasm is the object of intellect. . . . Human intellect in this life needs phantasms as objects—indeed, as proper objects. Since knowledge requires an object, and since phantasm is the object of intellect, a phantasm is always necessary for intellectual activity, no matter how perfect the *species intelligibilis.*[4]

From these excerpts and from what he says on the formation of he *verbum,* it is clear that Father Lonergan means the phantasm o be the primary, direct, known object of intellection. Now Father onergan notes that for St. Thomas the singular is known only by eflection, and he says that what the intellect knows in the phantasm s the universal. However, from the excerpts quoted here and from is explanation of abstraction, his position logically requires that the ntellect know the singular first and the universal secondarily; for he universal as such is only virtually present in the phantasm.

Secondly, since he is speaking of the cognitive intellect, there is no oom for interpreting him to mean that the agent intellect is involved ere. Indeed the agent intellect is mentioned only once, and then in onnection with Scotus's psychology.[5] So, too, the intelligible species *species impressa*) is mentioned but once, in the excerpt quoted above. et even a cursory reading of St. Thomas shows the absolutely central osition of the agent intellect and the intelligible species in the genesis f ideas.[6]

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[2] *Ibid.,* p. 359.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 381. (Italics mine.)

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 375.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 373, n. 125.

[6] See, e.g., *ST,* I, 85. 1-2; *CG,* II, 76; *De Ver.,* 2. 6; 10. 6.

Thirdly, the reason why St. Thomas could allow only a reflective, indirect knowledge of the singular and, therefore, of the phantasm, is that the phantasm is not intelligible in act, that is, the universal is present there not actually, but only virtually. It is precisely the function of the agent intellect, through the instrumentality of the phantasm, to produce an intelligible species in the possible intellect. The latter, informed by this species, is then able to produce the *verbum* and the act of intellection.

Again, of the nine texts used by Father Lonergan as foundation for the statements quoted above on phantasm-as-object, all but three refer the reader to the third book of Aristotle's *The Soul.*[7] In his commentary St. Thomas thus explains Aristotle:

> He [Aristotle] says, first of all, that phantasms are related to the intellective part of the soul as sensible objects are to sense. Therefore as the sense faculty is moved by the sensible objects, so the intellect is by the phantasms.[8]

The intellect, therefore, has the phantasm as object in the sense that it is passive to the action of the phantasm, is moved by it. There is no question, at this point, of cognition. The remaining three texts used by Father Lonergan explicitly interpret the dictum in terms of the necessity, for intellection, of the agent intellect and of the intelligible species which is the product of the agent intellect.

Finally, *De Veritate,* 2. 6, one of the passages used, is a most lucid explanation of the genesis of ideas and of the relation between the cognitive (possible) intellect and the phantasm. St. Thomas is careful there to point out that the sensible object and the phantasm are the "objects" of sense and intellect respectively only in an analogous fashion:

> Our intellect accidentally knows the singular; for, as the Philosopher says in his third book *On the Soul,* phantasms are related to our intellect as sensible objects are to sense, for example, as the colors which are outside the mind are related to sight. Therefore, just as the species which is in the sense faculty is drawn from things themselves, and through that species sense knowledge is somehow continued to the sensible objects themselves, so also our intellect abstracts species from phantasms and through the species its knowledge is somehow continued to the phantasms. But there is this difference. The likeness which is in the sense faculty is drawn

[7] *In II Sent.,* d. 17, 2. 1; *In IV Sent.,* d. 49, 2. 6 ad 3; *In Boet. de Trin.,* 6. 2c; *De Ver.,* 2. 6c; 10. 2 ad 7; 18. 8 ad 4; all refer to *The Soul;* the other three passages are *In II Sent.,* d. 20, 2. 2 ad 2; d. 24, 2. 2 ad 1; *Quaestio de Anima,* a. 15 ad 3.

[8] "Dicit . . . primo, quod phantasmata se habent ad intellectivam partem animae, sicut sensibilia ad sensum. Unde sicut sensus movetur a sensibilibus, ita intellectus a phantasmatibus" (*In III de Anima,* 12. 770 [Marietti]; cf. Aristotle *The Soul* iii. 7. 431a 14-15).

> from a thing as from a knowable object, and therefore the thing is directly known through the likeness. But the likeness which is in the intellect is not abstracted from the phantasm as from a knowable object but as from a medium of cognition. . . . Therefore, from the species it receives, our intellect is not directly brought to know the phantasm.[9]

Therefore the unqualified and unexplicated parallel made by Father Lonergan between sense and intellect on this point is entirely misleading. In the light of this passage from the *De Veritate* and of the explanation in the *De Anima* to which St. Thomas constantly refers, it is difficult to understand how Father Lonergan could have so misinterpreted "insight into phantasm." His treatment makes it clear that any discussion of the genesis of ideas in St. Thomas which does not stress the role of the agent intellect and the passivity of the possible intellect is bound to lead to misapprehensions. The further effects of these omissions shall be noted shortly.

CONCEPTUALIZATION

Father Lonergan insists that "apart from certain natural concepts, . . . it cannot even be suggested that Aquinas thought of conception as an automatic process. Conceptualization comes as the term and product of a process of reasoning."[10] Now St. Thomas does say that for the most part the *verbum* is formed by discourse.[11] But in interpreting this statement several points must be noted.

It will be found that in those passages (for example, *In Evangelium S. Joannis Commentaria,* I, 1, which Father Lonergan uses) in which St. Thomas says that the human intellect forms the *verbum* by discourse, it is by way of contrast to the divine or angelic intellects. For, in contrast with these latter, man's intellectual life is characterized by discourse.

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9 ". . . per accidens contingit quod intellectus noster singulare cognoscit; ut enim Philosophus dicit in III de Anima (com. 39), phantasmata se habent ad intellectum nostrum sicut sensibilia ad sensum, ut colores, qui sunt extra animam, ad visum; unde, sicut species quae est in sensu, abstrahitur a rebus ipsis, et per eam cognitio sensus continuatur ad ipsas res sensibiles; ita intellectus noster abstrahit speciem a phantasmatibus, et per eam cognitio ejus quodammodo ad phantasmata continuatur. Sed tamen tantum interest; quod similitudo quae est in sensu, abstrahitur a re ut ab objecto cognoscibili, et ideo res ipsa per illam similitudinem directe cognoscitur; similitudo autem quae est in intellectu, non abstrahitur a phantasmate sicut ab objecto cognoscibili, sed sicut a medio cognitionis. . . . Unde intellectus noster non directe ex specie quam suscipit, fertur ad cognoscendum phantasma" (*De Ver.,* 2. 6 [Marietti]).

10 *Art. cit.,* p. 384.

11 "Nec hoc requiritur ad rationem verbi quod scilicet actus intellectus, qui terminatur ad verbum interius, fiat cum aliquo discursu, quem videtur cogitatio importare; sed sufficit qualitercumque aliquid actu intelligatur. Quia tamen apud nos ut frequentius per discursum interius aliquid dicimus, propter hoc Damascenus (lib. I orth. Fidei, cap. xviii) et Anselmus (Monol., cap. xlvi circa med.) definientes verbum, utuntur cogitatione loco considerationis" (*De Ver.,* 4. 1 ad 1).

But that is not to say that man knows all but "certain natural concepts" (by which Father Lonergan means the concepts of act and potency and the concept of being as being) by discourse.

Further, although the process of discourse terminates in a *verbum* in which the intellect knows an essence or a truth, it cannot be said that in the process, during which the intellect is actually progressively knowing, there is no *verbum*. That is an impossible situation, since man can know only *in verbo*.

To catch the drift of Father Lonergan's interpretation of conceptualization we must hark back to certain remarks made by him in the earlier part of his article. He there says that in the first act of the intellect "one knows, not the thing, but only the idea of the thing, because as yet one is in a purely logical order."[12] (Need we remark that such a statement, with its logical implications, contains all the requisites for idealism?) To prove that the *verbum* as such is the prime object of thought, he quotes numerous passages from St. Thomas to the effect that the *verbum* is "that which is understood." I do not intend to prove here that for St. Thomas the *verbum* is primarily a formal sign, the *medium in quo* of intellectual cognition. M. Maritain has conclusively shown how the very texts adduced by Father Lonergan are to be interpreted in the context of St. Thomas's whole teaching on this point.[13]

This failure to see that we know objects *in verbo* is, in combination with his theory of intellectual knowledge of the universal in the phantasm, precisely one of the reasons why Father Lonergan can write:

> For human understanding, though it has its object in the phantasm and knows it in the phantasm, yet is not content with an object in this state. It pivots on itself to produce for itself another object which is the inner word as *ratio, intentio, definitio, quod quid est.* And this pivoting and production is no mere matter of some metaphysical sausage-machine, at one end slicing species off phantasm, and at the other popping out concepts; it is an operation of rational consciousness.[14]

This excerpt evidences, of course, a basic confusion of abstraction with the process of conceptualization. But, apart from this, there are two

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[12] *Art. cit.*, p. 357.

[13] J. Maritain, *Les Degrés du savoir* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1932), Annexe I, "A propos du concept"; see also J. Maritain, *Ransoming the Time* (New York: Scribner, 1941), chap. ix, "Sign and Symbol." Cf. the following clear statements of St. Thomas: ". . . objectum intellectus est ipsa rei essentia; quamvis essentiam rei cognoscat per ejus similitudinem, sicut per medium cognoscendi, non sicut per objectum in quo primo fertur ejus visio" (*De Ver.*, 10. 4 ad 1); ". . . conceptio intellectus ordinatur ad rem intellectam sicut ad finem; propter hoc enim intellectus conceptionem rei in se format ut rem intellectam cognoscat" (*De Pot.*, 8. 1c [Marietti]).

[14] *Art. cit.*, p. 381.

oints at issue here: the nature of the act of cognition (*intelligere*) and ne nature of abstraction.

Father Lonergan does not mention the fact that, though St. Thomas ften says that human intellection produces its object, he is using the rm "intellection" to cover two formalities, *dictio* and *intellectio* taken ormally as the act of knowing. For intellection, formally as the act of nowing, is cognition, that is, the union of knowing subject and known bject; as such, it presupposes the presence of the object. The act of ntellection, then, contrary to what Father Lonergan says, cannot be ormally a cognitive act when considered in its function of producing ne *verbum*. In this function the intellective act is called *dictio*. Acording to Father Lonergan, intellection, formally considered, would ccur before the formation of the *verbum;* thus the latter's production ould be, as he says, "an operation of rational consciousness." (This is ossible for him because he makes the phantasm the object of intellect; n act of knowledge must have some object.) St. Thomas is quite lear, however, on the distinction (a logical one with a foundation n reality) between *dictio* and *intellectio* and their interrelation. The llowing passage from the unauthentic but Thomistically inspired puscule *De Natura Verbi Intellectus* brings to focus this distinction hich is implicit in St. Thomas's very idea of cognition as a union and n the passages on *dictio:*[15]

> . . . Before the word is conceived, the intellect is first (with a priority of nature) informed by the species, which is the sufficient principle of intellection; and therefore the act of understanding is radically prior to the word, and the word is the term of the action of the intellect. But since there is no object except in the word, as has been said, and since the object is prior to any action which terminates at it, the word is therefore prior to the act of intellection.[16]

n other words, intellection as *productive* of the word must be *prior* to ne word with the priority of efficient causality; but considered as such cannot also be cognitive, since cognition can be had only when the

[15] Cf., e.g.: "Intelligere importat solam habitudinem intelligentis ad rem intelctam, in qua nulla ratio originis importatur, sed solum informatio quaedam in ntellectu nostro, prout intellectus noster fit in actu per fomam rei intellectae. . . . ed dicere importat principaliter habitudinem ad verbum conceptum; nihil enim st aluid dicere quam proferre verbum" (*ST,* I, 34. 1 ad 3); ". . . in nobis *dicere* on solum significat intelligere, sed intelligere, cum hoc quod est ex se exprimere liquam conceptionem" (*De Ver.,* 4. 2 ad 5).

[16] "Prius . . . natura est intellectus informatus specie, quae est principium afficiens intelligendi, quam gignatur verbum; et ideo intelligere in radice prius st verbo, et verbum est terminus actionis intellectus. Sed quia objectum non abetur nisi in verbo, ut dictum est, objectum autem prius est quam quaelibet ctio ad illud terminata, ideo verbum prius est quam intelligere" (*De Natura erbi Intellectus, in fine,* ed. Mandonnet [Lethellieux], V, 374).

object is existent; therefore intellection as *cognitive* is *posterior* to the word, which enjoys a priority of objective causality.

The conclusion is that according to St. Thomas the production of the word cannot be "an operation of rational consciousness," since it supplies the object which must be presupposed for any operation of rational consciousness.

ABSTRACTION

I noted above the confusion of conceptualization with the process of abstraction, as though abstraction terminated in a *verbum*. It is only to be expected, therefore, that Father Lonergan would make abstraction too, on all its levels, "an operation of rational consciousness." ". . . The rational character of conceptualization also implies a psychological account of abstraction." He explains that

> by a psychological account of abstraction we mean the *elimination by the understanding of the intellectually irrelevant because it is understood to be irrelevant.* That, we submit, is the very point of the celebrated three degrees of abstraction.[17]

If, in the words "intellectually irrelevant," Father Lonergan refers to the fact that the intellect grasps only essences directly, it is hard to see how the intellect can abstract by understanding certain aspects of the phantasm to be irrelevant; for its knowledge of the singular is only reflective and presupposes the already known universal. If, however—and his words seems to leave no alternative—the intellect knows the singular directly, and consciously "abstracts," then it is difficult to see any distinction between St. Thomas as thus interpreted and the nominalists with their "general ideas" formed for utilitarian purposes of classification.[18]

It is precisely at this point that Father Lonergan's failure or refusal to concern himself with the agent intellect and the intelligible species shows up in its disastrous results. According to him, abstraction would refer somehow to the formation of the *verbum* and would be the conscious work of the possible intellect, either in some way knowing before it has

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[17] *Art. cit.*, pp. 385-86. (Italics mine.)

[18] Cf., e.g., John Locke, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, chap. xxxii, No. 6: ". . . the natural tendency of the mind being towards knowledge; and finding that, if it should proceed by and dwell upon only particular things, its progress would be very slow, and its work endless; therefore, to shorten its way to knowledge, and make each perception more comprehensive, the first thing it does, as the foundation of the easier enlarging its knowledge, . . . by contemplation of the things themselves that it would know, . . . is to bind them into bundles, and rank them so into sorts, that what knowledge it gets of any of them it may thereby with assurance extend to all of that sort." Quite clearly, I am not accusing Father Lonergan of similarity of language; he uses scholastic terminology and would have the intellect really know essences, unlike Locke. What is at question is the logic of Father Lonergan's position.

n object or else knowing directly the phantasm and therefore the ingular, as I have already pointed out. But a most cursory reading f the pertinent parts of St. Thomas's treatise on man in the *Summa heologica*[19] shows that abstraction is the work of the combined agent ntellect and phantasm and that it consists in the eduction of the intelligible species in the possible intellect. Abstraction, then (except for he third mode or degree, which is truly a conscious process and the work of the possible intellect), is a preconscious operation. Its purpose s to put the possible intellect in act to know.

THE CONCEPT OF BEING

A few remarks on Father Lonergan's treatment of the concept of being as being (*ens qua ens, ens inquantum hujusmodi*) will show to what degree of misinterpretation of St. Thomas his theory of psychological abstraction can lead. It is clear, of course, that the abstraction of *ens qua ens* is the conscious work of the possible intellect, that is, the work of rational consciousness, unlike the first two degrees of abstraction.

If this concept were a natural one, all men would be metaphysicians from birth, which is evidently not a fact. For this reason alone, if for no other, the concept of being as being cannot be the first concept of the mind. Yet Father Lonergan confuses the concept of being as such with that concept of being which St. Thomas calls the first and natural concept of the mind, the concept which cannot be unknown to it. The source of his misinterpretation is, of course, his absorption with his theory of "psychological abstraction." He says: ". . . what is prior to the first concept is, not a prior concept, but an act of understanding; and like other concepts, the concept of being is an effect of the act of understanding"; and ". . . the concept of being . . . is the conceptualization of intelligibility as such."[20]

To defend St. Thomas against such a very questionable interpretation requires no great effort or genius. It is quite clear that in the passages in which St. Thomas speaks of being as the first object of the intellect, he does not mean being as being, that is, in its purity and transcendentality in the third degree of abstraction, but merely being as *aliquid reale*, that is, some material thing:

> . . . the first object of our intellect in its present state is not any being and truth whatsoever, but being and truth as found in material things, from which we proceed to the knowledge of all other things.[21]

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[19] Cf. n. 6 above.

[20] *Art. cit.*, p. 390.

[21] *ST*, I, 87. 3 ad 1.

But behind Father Lonergan's position on being qua being as the prime concept, there is a more fundamental and serious difficulty—a basic misunderstanding of the very meaning of the concept of being qua being.

> . . . the concept of being cannot but be analogous; being is always conceived in the same way—as the expression of intelligibility or intelligence in act; but the content of one act of intelligibility or intelligence differs from the content of another; it is the identity of the process that necessitates the similarity of the proportion, and it is the diversity of the content that makes the terms of proportion different.[22]

We may note, first of all, a purely logical difficulty: if the concept of being is indeterminate, as Father Lonergan claims, and if being is the conceptualization of pure intelligibility as such, what terms are there and how could they possibly differ?

Father Lonergan is not talking about the predication of the concept of being, but about its formation and its status simply as a concept apart from predication; yet he calls it an analogous concept. The analogy of being, however, refers only to the predication of the concept and presupposes the concept as already formed; one need read no further than *Summa Theologica,* I, 13. 5 to learn that. The concept of being as a concept and not as a predicate is called—and Father Lonergan never once uses the word—a transcendental concept, that is, a concept which includes actually all its inferiors. The concept of being as being includes all its inferiors actually, yet it is one concept, because it is formed by obscuring the relation that exists between essence and the act of existence, the two components of being. That the concept includes actually all its inferiors is shown in that it can be predicated of any particular being without any extrinsic addition. But when the concept is predicated it is no longer transcendental, since the act of predication clarifies the relation that exists in the subject between the essence and the act of existence; thus the concept applies only to this particular being. It is in function of being predicated of various beings that the concept of being is analogous. Father Lonergan attempts the impossible and contradictory task of forming a concept of being which, apart from being predicated, is somehow analogous. As a result, for him *the* concept of being is two or more concepts.

CONCLUSION

To those who have, by much careful reading and study of the text of the Angelic Doctor, acquainted themselves with the fundamental principles of his metaphysics of cognition, the foregoing remarks of explana-

[22] *Art. cit.,* p. 391.

on will offer nothing new. But it is not to the enlightenment of such homists that this article is directed; we consider Father Lonergan's isinterpretation too evident to need attention called to it. Nor is is article motivated by the dubious pleasure of destructive criticism. rather intends to point out how easily the disciple, in interpreting the aster, may deny the fundamental principles of the master's whole ought. And, more important, it intends to warn any to whom the homistic theory of cognition may be unknown that Father Lonergan's terpretation is not a defensible exposition of that theory. Any hilosopher has the right to speculate—no one can deny him that; t he has not the right to speculate in the name of St. Thomas Aquinas, less he accepts and follows the basic principles that guided St. homas's own thought.

POSTSCRIPT

After I had written the above criticism, I noticed several remarks Father Lonergan, apropos of the present subject, in the December, 946, issue of *Theological Studies*.[23] Two points deserve attention. "For both Aristotle and Aquinas, . . . 'intelligere est pati.' "[24] But the immanent "action" of intellecting be really not an action at all ut only a passion, then the only true action is of the transient type. What, then, does St. Thomas mean by his constantly reiterated distinction between actions that pass to external matter and actions "that emain in the *agent,* for example, *to understand,* to sense, and to will"?[25] uch immanent actions cannot be understood merely in terms of formal ausality: the word "agent" precludes such an interpretation, and, esides, "intelligere est dicere" as well. It is an absolute misstatement, hen, to claim that "at no time did Aquinas advance or suppose that n immanent act has to be caused efficiently by the faculty in which it ccurs."[26]

But does not St. Thomas say, "intelligere *nostrum* est pati"?[27] Certainly he does. But we must do more than quote words: we must also rasp their proper contextual meaning. In what sense, at what stage the totality of an intellectual operation, is the intellect passive? It passive only at the outset: it is a *tabula rasa,* pure potency in the order

[23] Review of E. Iglesias, S.J., *De Deo in Operatione Naturae vel Voluntatis perante,* in *Theological Studies,* December, 1946, pp. 602-13.

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 606.

[25] See *ST,* I, 18. 3 ad 1; and confer any index to St. Thomas's works for umberless other passages.

[26] Lonergan, *Theological Studies,* p. 611.

[27] *ST,* I, 79. 2.

of understanding, which must be actuated (whence the name *possible* intellect) by the agent intellect by means of an intelligible species which, together with the possible intellect (now no longer possible or passive but in act to act), forms an adequate efficient cause of intellection itself.[28] It is only by completely neglecting to take into consideration the agent intellect and the intelligible species that Father Lonergan can interpret this phrase of St. Thomas as he does.

The second point concerns interpretation in general: "Logically, the interpretation of a writer is a matter of formulating an hypothesis, working out its presuppositions and its implications, and verifying in the text the presuppositions, the hypothesis itself, and the implications."[29] This description corroborates what I assumed above to be Father Lonergan's approach to the text of St. Thomas. But this "hypothesis" approach is, to say the least, open to the danger of seeking in St. Thomas mere verbal concordances with one's hypothesis. This manner of interpretation could suffer no greater refutation than Father Lonergan's own use of the phrase "intelligere est pati."

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[28] Cf. *ST*, I, 85. 2 ad 3; *CG*, I, 53.

[29] Lonergan, *Theological Studies*, p. 609.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

RELIGIOUS THOUGHTS OF A SCIENTIST

Attention may be called here to a book which has not been examined at ıy length in the philosophical journals, probably because of its primarily ligious import.[1] The enthusiastic and indefatigable translator of ierkegaard's works, Dr. Walter Lowrie, has now heeded the claims of prior love and a constant devotion" to the religious essays of Gustav heodor Fechner. This nineteenth-century German scholar is better ıown in our country for his pioneer work in the field of psychophysics ıd scientific esthetics. Thanks, however, to the generous notice of illiam James and a translation of *The Little Book of Life after Death,* ıericans have had some acquaintance with another aspect of Fechner's any-sided mind. The present volume contains representative selec-ons from his extensive writings on religious matters, arranged sys-ıatically under four headings. The major problems which he nsidered were: the motives and grounds of faith, the nature of souls, e soul life of plants, and the culminating question of God and immor-lity. In addition, Lowrie has provided a biographical sketch and a lemical chapter on science, religion, and the decline and fall of arwinism. He notes that the publication of the book was delayed for o years, owing to the unwillingness of any university press to assume sponsibility for this latter chapter, in which the ultimate fate of the arwinian theory is discussed with a noticeable lack of that awed spect which we have come to expect from historians when they touch on the development of science. Even the student of religion will ve to admit, however, that American religious thinking was itself pro-undly modified as a result of the controversy over Darwinism in the st century.

In presenting this testimony from an acknowledged scientist about e world as an animated whole, Lowrie hopes to address those minds ıich have been influenced and troubled by the older mechanistic version natural law. His aim is to show that scientific knowledge and train-g need not be incompatible with religious belief, and for this purpose chner provides a splendid example. Throughout these pages can be

[1] *Religion of a Scientist: Selections from Gustav Th. Fechner,* edited and nslated by Walter Lowrie (New York: Pantheon Books, 1946).

felt a strong religious spirit full of natural piety and open to the influence of Christian teaching. The positive affirmations about the basic principles of a religious outlook should be weighed for their own sake before critical analysis is made of Fechner's natural theology and certain cosmological speculations which his pupil, Wundt, once characterized as "not fantastical, but full of fantasy." Apart from the direct intent of author and translator, this book will be of special interest to Scholastic philosophers and to students of contemporary philosophy of religion.

The former group of thinkers will find here a casebook in certain lines of thinking with which they are already familiar in a general way, but which offer special difficulties in their Fechnerian development. For instance, the author was zealous to defend the truly vital nature of animals and plants against Cartesian automatism. This led him to inquire into the essential notes of life, among which are placed sense perception and a corresponding degree of consciousness. Hence it is argued that a minimum sensibility characterizes the soul of plants. Further investigation of the nature and extent of life convinced Fechner that the stars are also animated, thus reverting to one version of the classical doctrine on the angelic movers of the spheres. It was his speculation on angels and on the earth as a single living organism which was severely criticized during his own lifetime. As logical justification for his position, Fechner made appeal to the analogical mode of thinking about such fundamental perfections as life and activity. Miss Emmet[2] has recently shown the necessity for analogy in metaphysics, especially in establishing the grounds for a philosophy of religion. The main task, of course, is to determine which sort of analogy is most proper when men wish to discourse about God. For his own part, Fechner saw clearly what doctrines on God ought to be *avoided:* agnosticism, crude anthropomorphism, impersonal absolute idealism. Yet he could find no other way of building our analogical knowledge of God upon an immediately known experience than to liken God's relation to the world to that of the human soul to its body. This he sought to do without confusing finite imperfections with the divine mode of being and without separating God from the world which he is said to animate in its entirety. Here is a modern theory which could provide concrete materials for a critique from the standpoint of the Thomistic doctrine on analogy. Not only the end result but also the intermediate stages in Fechner's thinking offer a definite opportunity for displaying the actuality of the perennial philosophy of being.

[2] *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking,* by Dorothy M. Emmet (London: Macmillan, 1946).

Many points in Fechner's exposition of the relation between God nd the world—especially with regard to God's assumption of the cosmic ravail and progress and struggle with pain and evil—anticipate recent American philosophies of religion. Thinkers as diverse in standpoint s Parker and Hartshorne and Brightman have turned to Fechner for uidance in dealing with the nature of God, the problem of evil, and he development of the good principle in the universe. Their basic debt o Fechner is for the suggestions he made concerning the use of the mpirical principle in religion. Fechner conceived faith or religious nderstanding in the broadest sense not as a body of truth opposed to cientific knowledge but as an extension of knowledge and a supplement- ng of its limits and deficiencies. Faith is not established by strict roof, and yet it must maintain harmony with scientific knowledge even o the extent of employing certain principles of scientific method. Re- igious experience is not an adequate criterion, although faith must be ounded squarely upon experience and the truths which can be inferred rom experimental data. More proper to the religious approach, how- ver, is the use of analogy and induction from the facts of existence in he direction of the infinite.

> The essential thing is to start out from the greatest possible area of empirical observations in the sphere of earthly existence, in order that, by generalizing, broadening and exalting the points of view which are offered here, we may attain a conception of what holds good beyond this in the other, the wider and higher sphere of existence (p. 123).

By means of this principle, Fechner hoped to overcome both a mate- ialism which stops at the visible world as the divine form and an bstract idealism which would so separate God from concrete reality hat faith has no content and fullness. It also provided him with a way o defend God's infinity and unity beforehand against the notion of a nite God which William James was to make popular. God must not e foreign to the trials of the world, but neither can his majesty be etracted from. Indeed, as Professor Hartshorne has remarked, the roblem of God's immanence and transcendence remains the crucial enter of all recent philosophy of religion. It cannot be said that echner's contribution provides a decisive answer. Yet his insistence pon analogy, upon the positive relation between faith, knowledge, and xperience, and upon practical considerations and historical tradition, oes indicate a more balanced solution than has yet been provided in ur country by either idealism or pragmatism or the present cult of a nite God.

Lowrie's editorial work would perhaps have been more pointed had e taken account of this contemporary relevance of Fechner's theories.

Occasional errors have also crept into his annotations, such as in the Latin quotation on page 75, the reference to F. C. S. *Schilling* (p. 116), and the remark (p. 25) that Kant (who died in 1804) was cognizant of a tract published in 1838.[3] Also it has been too long customary among informed Protestant divines to take Przywara's account of *analogia entis* as the definitive Catholic exposition of this doctrine, whereas the difficulties in his views have been pointed out by other Catholic thinkers on several occasions. The main responsibility here lies nonetheless with the remaining Catholic philosophers and theologians who have not made the same persistent effort as did Przywara to understand Barth and to offer a detailed and concrete theory which is actually applicable to the peculiar difficulties raised by neo-orthodox Protestantism (or neomodernism, in Van Til's judgment). We owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Lowrie for completing this work of love with such enthusiasm, care, and understanding.

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THE Xth INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

The Modern Schoolman has received the following communication from the organizing committee of the Xth International Congress of Philosophy:

Amsterdam, November 1946.

The 9th International Congress of Philosophy (Congrès-Descartes), which took place in Paris in August 1937, accepted at its final session the Dutch Government's invitation to meet again in the Netherlands. The 10th Congress would have met in Groningen, in September, 1941, had not the war prevented this. In February, 1940, an indefinite delay of the Congress was agreed upon. Only some months later the Netherlands were overpowered. Shortly after Professor Leonard Polak was arrested; he died in the concentration camp of Sachsenhausen, a victim of an inhuman ideology.

The committee which had constituted itself under Polak's chairmanship agreed to resume their task as soon as cir-

[3] On this last point, Lowrie is certainly confused. The essay of Kant's to which he refers has nothing to do with *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft.* It is rather the third section of Kant's *Der Streit der Fakultäten* (1798). This third section was separately reprinted in 1798, was given a second edition in 1824 under the supervision of C. W. Hufeland, and has been popularly reprinted from this latter edition by Reklam. Lowrie's copy was from the Reklam edition.

cumstances would permit and have decided, in agreement with the board of the preceding congress and the "Institut international de philosophie," to summon the Congress to Amsterdam during the summer of 1948 to meet at a date yet to be arranged between August 15th and September 15th. We now address to the students of philosophy in all countries, which during the last years have served the cause of mankind, a first call. We feel that the Congress will, at this very moment, meet the sympathy and the active support of all those who endorse the idea of humanity and who prefer universal values over particular interests. The material difficulties, which, at this moment, hamper international relations and traffic, presumably will gradually diminish; in 1948 it will be possible to travel to the Netherlands without too much trouble. The assistance promised in this respect by the section Literature and Philosophy of the UNESCO has been gratefully accepted.

The Congress will reflect as far as possible the philosophical activities during the years since 1937. The board are fully aware of the present situation in philosophy, which is characterized by a predominance of diversity over unity. They accept the diversity without indulging in any illusions of bringing about a unification.

They consider a meeting of representatives of divergent currents of thought as highly profitable, provided it is inspired by a desire for objectivity and mutual respect. On the other hand they are anxious to prevent the Congress from becoming merely a fortuitous encounter of these tendencies where, in spite of all objectivity, the impression of a total lack of unity would prevail. In order to meet this danger the choice of a central theme, imposed by the inner development of philosophy as well as the present state of mankind, seemed justified. This theme is given by the ideas of *man, humanity and mankind,* which are so closely interconnected, that their philosophical clarification cannot be performed without constant mutual consultation.

This central theme borrows its significance from the fact, that it points to the common origin, from which the divergent currents of thought may be considered; it indicates a common problem, to which they all refer. In dealing with this theme, we certainly cannot do without the

contributions of sciences such as sociology, psychology, psychiatrics, ethnology and the history of civilization.

The other domains of philisophy will, of course, be present at the Congress besides its central theme; the theory of knowledge, the theory of values, the problems of metaphysics will not be lacking. Wherever possible they will be brought in connection with the central theme, without prejudice to the autonomous treatment of their special problems. For the plenary meetings papers will be invited on the central theme as well as on the other great problems. Provisional subscriptions for the Congress and announcements of short papers to be read in the sections will be very welcame to the secretariate. Especially any suggestions regarding the fundamental idea and its practical elaboration will be gratefully accepted.

Further communications will follow, in order to keep future participants informed on the state of our preparations.

The Organizing Committee

H. J. POS, University of Amsterdam, chairman.
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BOOK REVIEWS

ANGUAGE AND MYTH. By Ernst Cassirer. Translated by Susanne K. Langer. Harper, New York, 1946. Pp. xii + 103. $2.00.

This essay appeared originally more than twenty years ago in the *tudien der Bibliothek Warburg* (VI) and was intended to give a brief mmary of the author's work *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen,* which the first volume had already been published. The present udy is intended to make accessible the basic ideas to the general reader so. Cassirer's views have been partly embodied in his *Essay on Man,* nd he returns to them in his posthumous work *The Myth of the State.* his slender volume, however, which has been ably translated by r. Langer, furnishes a more comprehensive, if more condensed, survey.

It may be questioned whether it is wise to present an author's ideas in shape they had years ago, particularly since in twenty years' time good deal of evidence has come forth which either may supplement invalidate one or other notion. To bring such a study up to date, owever, is not the task of a translator, nor is it feasible within so arrow a frame. Thus, a reader well acquainted with the evidence may el inclined to raise objections which the author, perhaps, might have nswered or not, as the case may be. One has to bear in mind that is essay is, first, of a preliminary and summarizing nature, and, cond, that it was written a long time ago.

Apart from the objections which might come from the specialist, ere are others which refer to the general trend and the basic nilosophy of the late Dr. Cassirer. He belonged to the neo-Kantian hool of Marburg; and if he did not always see eye to eye with the her representatives of this school, he nonetheless never abandoned his ndamentally Kantian approach. Being gifted with an unusual power synthesis, an amazing capacity to arrange the most divergent matters ithin one all-comprising framework, the author has integrated into a nsistent whole his Kantian philosophy and his extensive knowledge of mparative ethnology, psychology, and history. Fully to appreciate en this little essay, one ought to be acquainted with his great works, pecially with that on the *Erkenntnisproblem* (in three volumes—a urth, in English, is announced). In reviewing the present study,

it will be necessary to refer sometimes to the general views underlying it.

Contrary to the tendency—common among modern idealistic and, especially, neo-Kantian thinkers—Cassirer realizes that (to quote the translator's preface) "philosophy of mind involves much more than a theory of knowledge; it involves a theory of prelogical conception and expression, and their final culmination in reason and factual knowledge." The titles of the six chapters will give an idea of the problems studied: "The Place of Language and Myth in the Pattern of Human Culture"; "The Evolution of Religious Ideas"; "Language and Conception"; "Word-Magic"; "The Successive Phases of Religious Thought"; "The Power of Metaphor." It should not be forgotten that the German use of the two words *civilization* and *culture* is rather the opposite of the English use; when Cassirer speaks of culture he refers to what one habitually calls civilization. A. J. Toynbee, in his great work *A Study of History,* has pointed out this eventual source of misunderstanding.

Modern "skeptical" criticism of language leads inevitably to the conclusion (p. 7) that language has no truth content; its content is "nothing but a sort of phantasmagoria of the spirit. . . . Consequently all schemata which science evolves . . . turn out to be nothing but arbitrary schemes . . . which express not the nature of things, but the nature of mind." "Against this self-dissolution of the spirit" the only remedy is to "accept seriously . . . the Copernican revolution" of Kant. The various spiritual forms have a spontaneous law of generation which we must discover. Thus, "myth, art, language, and science appear as symbols, not as referring to a given reality by means of some allegory, but as forces each of which produces and posits a world of its own." Language, art, and mythology are "archetypal phenomena of human mentality" which can be indicated as such but are not capable of any further explanation in terms of something else (p. 11). The analysis of reality in terms of things and processes, permanent and transitory aspects, and objects and actions does not precede language; it is language which initiates and develops such articulations. Myth has a similar function. In this, the author takes up a view and a problem originally stated by H. Usener in his famous work *Götternamen* (1896), and he remains indebted to this scholar in many of the later discussions. Usener claimed that epistemology needs for a real foundation what philology and mythology may reveal of the "processes of unvoluntary and unconcious conception."

It is particularly one idea of Usener which becomes of pivotal importance. According to this author the oldest phase in the evolution of theological concepts is that of the "momentary deities." These come and go; however, the illustrations Cassirer adds from Spieth, *Die Religion*

r Eweer (1911), and some of the author's remarks do not confirm s view; the deity emerges indeed momentarily, but once emerged remains an object of worship at least for an individual or his family. may be quite true that, as Usener says, an "individual phenomenon deified without the intervention of even the most rudimentary class ncept," but the deity then becomes, as Cassirer points out, independent the accidental conditions in which it emerged (p. 35); it is no longer momentary creation, but becomes an objective and superior power. bjectivation is achieved by a visible sign or by a name; words possess kind of objective reality, a meaningfulness in their own right. Pri-arily, language functions not as a means of comparison or selection of mmon attributes, but of concentration of experiences which are ited by their relation to interest—hence by a teleological trend. Whatever appears important for our wishing . . . for acting and doing: at and that only receives the stamp of verbal 'meaning' " (p. 37). One alizes that the author, like many of his contemporaries, views man imarily as *homo faber*.

The animal mind is able to distinguish and to notice; but the world which the animal is aware stays within the narrow confines of actual ives and excitations. "Only symbolic expression can yield the pos-bility of prospect and retrospect." By symbols, distinctions are not ly made but fixed in consciousness.

Recognition of function precedes that of being. (See Cassirer's *ubstanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*, one of his earlier works.) The stinctions of the aspects of being are not guided by the awareness of bjective similarity but by "their appearance through the medium of actice which relates them within a purposive nexus." All symbolic rms must be emancipated from a common matrix of myth to become parate, independently recognizable forms.

The original bond between linguistic and mythico-religious conscious-ess is evidenced, Cassirer thinks, by the "fact that verbal structures bpear also as mythical entities . . . that the Word . . . becomes a sort of imary force" (p. 45) in word-magic. The author insists particularly n the use of the formula "in the name of" and seeks to explain many ligious functions in the light of magic. These views are, as one nows, not new. Cassirer is, it seems, far from claiming that advanced ligious consciousness is still of the nature of magic; he is concerned ith the origin of such expressions. However, he might have empha-zed that old forms may be given not only a new but a wholly different eaning and that, therefore, the nature of a religious act or notion may ee itself totally from any magical connotation. One might suggest at the formula "in the name of" may have undergone, in passing from

primitive to advanced civilizations, a profound change and have assumed another signification. The factor which might be credited with a definite influence is writing. An edict or a letter owes its importance to the signature of the ruler or whoever the writer is. When another person writes instead of the ruler, the writer's name stands for that of the authority behind him. He therefore writes "in the name of," or he speaks in the same capacity. Since the name guarantees the authenticity, the bearer of delegated power signs his name "for," or he signs in the name of the other. This stage is disregarded in the author's argument.

Cassirer stresses the difference between mythic and discursive ideation. The latter aims at establishing relationships between the given phenomenon and others which are like the first, at connecting a multitude of phenomena by a universal law. The word is a sign or symbol. In mythical thought a thing is taken for its immediate appearance, as pure presentation and not for what it means indirectly. The word has there not the "remoteness from the sphere of immediate data" to which it owes the freedom and ease with which it moves among specific objects connecting them with one another. Its logical nature is rooted in the "free ideality" (p. 57). The author here returns to his Kantian principles by referring to Kant's concept of reality. "Whatever has been fixed by a name, henceforth is not only real, but is reality." (A further development too long for this brief essay would have to show how the categories are related to words, and how this interpretation is in accordance with Kant's procedure of starting with an analysis and classification of judgments.)

Logical reasoning tends to "resolve all receptivity into spontaneity," whereas mythic conception tends to regard all spontaneous action as receptive and all human achievement as something merely bestowed. One wonders that the author does not consider the possibility of a synthesis of these two extreme views, the like of which he might have found in Scholastic philosophy. The posthumous work on *The Myth of the State* contains some excellent chapters on medieval thought, mainly indeed in regard to the way human nature was envisioned, and there tribute is paid especially to Aquinas. However, it may be that Cassirer was not as fully aware of the basic ideas of Scholasticism when he wrote the present essay.

The last chapters elaborate the ideas exposed before; a further discussion may be omitted. Some critical remarks, besides those suggested above, are indicated.

In studying Cassirer's works one must distinguish between his astonishing power of analysis, and his often exceedingly stimulating

ews in the fields of psychology, ethnology, or anthropology, and his sic philosophy. The latter may be unacceptable; nonetheless, it is ry instructive to follow the author's reasoning. There is no need to iticize here the tenets of neo-Kantianism. One might, however, ques- n Cassirer's basic notion of "symbol." In a sentence quoted above places *sign* and *symbol* side by side, as if no distinction were neces- ry. Thus, the notion of the symbol receives a very wide application. ut, is it true that *sign* and *symbol* are interchangeable? Particularly, the word a symbol in the same sense as one of the typical symbols of ythical or magical thinking? Of course, the terms are often used as they were synonymous, as in *mathematical symbols,* or *symbolic logic.* may be—and this reviewer is not competent to judge on this matter— at words have a symbolic function in the same sense as other symbols more primitive forms of mentality; namely, when the name is con- ived as a real property of the thing. Children seem to think in some ch way. But the genetic interpretation does not allow a final judg- ent on the perfected object. A genetical interpretation, in the words John Laird, is about genesis only and about nothing besides. In more dvanced stages of human development, a symbol appears as charac- rized by the fact that the thing functioning as a symbol has a meaning nd nature of its own; it is something in its own right; it pertains a definite context or "universe." The word, or the mathematical gn, has no such meaning; in itself, as a physical phenomenon, it is eaningless. To avoid confusion we need a systematical study of signs nd of signification which has to go beyond the discussion in Husserl's *ogische Untersuchungen,* however instructive this may be. One would ave to take up the analysis of signification where the medieval students this problem left off. Some references may be gathered from the ork of Prantl or the introduction to Wallerand's edition of the eatise by Siger of Courtrai; and Maritain has contributed some valu- ble ideas, mainly based on John of St. Thomas. But the older liter- ure contains many important remarks on this topic. Perhaps, in the ght of such an analysis of signification, the foregoing similarity, not to y identity, that Cassirer sees between linguistic, aesthetic, or artistic, ythical, and scientific "symbolism" will appear as less well founded an he believes.

Nonetheless, it is worth while to devote some study to the world of eas and the wealth of facts that Cassirer has brought together in his orks. The impressiveness which he knows how to give to his argu- ents, the clarity of his style, and the personality back of it all will no ubt attract many people. Also one who does not agree with him in s basic assumptions should take notice of his work, so as to be able

to separate what is of lasting value from what is the offspring of a particular kind of philosophy.

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PLATO'S THEORY OF MAN. By John Wild. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1946. Pp. vii + 320. $5.00.

The title *Plato's Theory of Man* may appear misleading to some. Professor Wild, however, at once warns us, "This book is not an attempt to expound the whole of Plato's philosophy, nor even of a single part of his philosophy, as 'historic' exposition is often understood. Its aim is not so much to reveal the thought of Plato as to reveal the nature of human culture and its inversion, using Plato, the philosopher, as a guide" (p. 1). However, the use made of Plato implies an interpretation of the "historic" Plato and, indeed, of the history of Western thought in general. (See especially "Plato and the Tradition of Classical Philosophy," pp. 1-44.)

Professor Wild asserts that there is a sharp contrast between the "classical tradition" and modern philosophy since Descartes. The former was realistic, rationalistic, and personalist; the latter was and is subjectivistic, voluntaristic (or subrational) and, in its anthropology, antipersonal (p. 2). The present chaos in every department of culture has sent men in search of a realistic philosophy and hence to the one realistic philosophy in the West—that of the classical tradition. Thus Professor Wild's criticism of modern thought agrees in general with what modern Thomists have been saying. It is sound and correct and is amplified by detailed criticism throughout the book.

Professor Wild further maintains that the classical tradition in philosophy was essentially a single unified stream of thought.[1] Hence he defends the thesis of the essential harmony of Plato and Aristotle.

He attempts first of all to reduce the opposition between the extant works of Plato and of Aristotle to a difference in viewpoint and method. Plato is practical, concrete, moralistic; Aristotle is abstract, formal, theoretical. It is undeniable that Plato and Aristotle are

[1] To maintain this thesis Professor Wild would have to examine the evidence and conclusions presented in the following publications (among others): Aimé Forest, *La Structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas D'Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 1931); Etienne Gilson, *God and Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale 1941); Anton C. Pegis, "The Dilemma of Being and Unity," in *Essays in Thomism* (New York: Sheed, 1942), pp. 149-83; Anton C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Greeks*, The Aquinas Lecture, 1939 (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1939).

pposed in manner and approach. Moreover, this opposition has been sed by some writers as though of itself it constituted a theoretical ifference. It is also true, as Professor Wild points out, that nineteenth-entury criticism of Plato was too often conducted on idealistic lines nd with an anti-Aristotelian basis. But all this still leaves the question f the essential harmony of Plato and Aristotle an open one.

Professor Wild further appeals to the harmonizers of later tradition. hey surely bear witness to a conviction that Plato and Aristotle are ot opposed but rather mutually complementary. But precisely the fforts of these harmonizers gave rise, particularly in the Christian tra-ition, to that inner confusion and conflict which reached the point of risis in the thirteenth century. The failure of these harmonizers to ork out their theory in detail is rather an argument against the theory self.

Now the interpretation of "Plato, the philosopher" used throughout he body of Professor Wild's book is at once an application of the thesis f harmony and an argument for its truth. Professor Wild undoubtedly chieves the impression that Plato and Aristotle thought alike. How is his impression created?

Apropos of certain questions concerning knowledge, Professor Wild rites: "To anyone seeking an answer to these questions the *Theaetetus* s full of fertile hints and suggestions, later clarified and developed by Aristotle and his successors" (p. 252). This is a concise statement of is general method. The development of example and concrete detail nd even the immediate analysis of the data are drawn from Plato, but he general theories and technical explanations are taken from "Aristotle nd his successors." By this synthesis, the "hints and suggestions" f Plato become Plato's *expression* of the very theories which Aristotle ormally taught.

Now there is indeed a good basis for this procedure. Plato never chieved, or at least, never expounded in the extant dialogues, an rticulated and detailed *system* to which every detail of experience was ubordinated and in which every insight was ordered and explicated. There are, indeed, central theories in Plato that would necessarily domi-nate any such constructive system. However, the profound genius of Plato did not allow him to view all things through theory; his writings re full of shrewd observations and profound insights which, so to peak, overflow his own theoretic formulations.

It is therefore possible to find in Plato evidence—in the form, at east, of "hints and suggestions"—that goes beyond his own theories. Professor Wild precisely takes this evidence and its rather concrete nterpretation and goes beyond pure Platonic *theory*—into Aristotelian-

ism. This combining of the insights and data of Plato with the clear and accurate theories of Aristotle is indeed an interesting philosophical experiment and produces a rich contribution to philosophy; but it does not demonstrate the essential harmony of Plato and Aristotle, for it is achieved through a selection of data governed by the theory of harmony and, therefore, precisely by-passes the theoretical oppositions. The method is made possible by the realistic genius of Plato and Aristotle and their *continuity* but it reaches a *synthesis* by presupposing it.

An example may make this clear. Plato's conception of the soul and its relation to the body is theoretically opposed to Aristotle's—and this opposition is one of the tensions of later philosophical discussions especially in the thirteenth century.[2] Yet Plato constantly recognized the fact of psychosomatic phenomena, a fact which is difficult to explain on his own theory but which fits perfectly into the Aristotelian and Thomistic theories. Here are certainly "hints and suggestions" susceptible of an Aristotelian development. By stressing these and by explaining other assertions of Plato on the soul as having *only* moral implications, Professor Wild makes the Platonic soul wear an Aristotelian aspect.

Again, for example, the Platonic theory of ideas (which has undoubtedly occupied too much space in modern studies) ceases in Professor Wild's interpretation to be radically opposed to Aristotle's theory of abstraction. He waives the metaphysical seriousness of Plato's theory in so far as it goes beyond the point where common ground may be found with Aristotle. Both Plato and Aristotle hold to objective knowledge and absolute standards; both maintain the rational and universal nature of scientific knowledge. But is this all that Plato's formulation of the Theory of Forms means?[3]

Obviously, to establish this criticism would require a minute examination of texts and positions which is impossible in a review.[4] We must therefore let the criticism stand in this general form.

Professor Wild's main purpose, however, is not "historic" exposition. He proposes rather to work out a philosophy of "human culture."

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[2] Anton Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1934).

[3] Among modern interpreters, F. M. Cornford has done a great deal to rectify the interpretation of Plato and to free it from the idealistic assumptions of earlier scholars. He seems to have arrived at a balanced and well-founded statement of the Theory of Forms. However, he writes, "I agree . . . that the 'separate' existence of the Forms, attacked by Aristotle, is not to be explained away." *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (New York: Harcourt, 1935), p. 2, n. 1.

[4] Professor Wild's "harmonizing" is manifested in numerous detailed remarks. For example, in discussing the analogy in the "image of the cave"

Human culture includes the whole range of arts and techniques, ancillary o human living, which achieved through virtue, is guided and ordered y subordination through wisdom to the nature of things as they are. Thus a hierarchy of means and ends is set up at every level and throughut the whole of human culture. The health of culture consists precisely n the maintaining of the proper order; its disease is "inversion" "sophistry"), the end being subordinated to the means, for example, uman living to technology; the higher to the lower, for example, metahysics to natural science; the objective to the subjective, for example, ne nature of things to the knowing mind. Professor Wild studies roper order and its inversion in the human arts, in social life, in ndividual life, in education, in knowledge, and in metaphysics. The udy is well done and witnesses not only to profound meditation on Plato and Aristotle but also to a deal of personal thinking. The analyses re excellent and the application to modern culture is telling indeed. Detailed criticism is impossible here but a few points might be singled ut.

"Infallible oracular authority" in the Church is regarded, apparently, s the result of an "inversion" (pp. 108-10; 122). It was due to a ailure in insight on the part of Christian leaders after the time of Constantine the Great.

This involves, first of all, an error in history, for the principle of uthority was present in the Christian Church from the beginning. From Christ and St. Paul on, the Christian was told that he must accept *ruths* on infallible authority and the theory of the teaching authority as formulated very early in the *charisma veritatis* of St. Irenaeus. The great "inversion" in modern Christianity was the revolt against eligious authority in the sixteenth century. Precisely this inversion rought about the "increasing number of divergent sects" which Proessor Wild notes with disapproval and parallels with inversions in ther departments of modern culture (p. 3).

Faith is the acceptance, on the authority of God, of truths many of hich lie beyond our discovery or our "perfect apprehension" (p. 74). The purity and unity of faith is guaranteed by the infallible teaching uthority of the Church. This does not mean that faith or teaching uthority relieves us of the necessity of thinking or absolves us from ne duty of seeking understanding; it is not a fetter to the mind but n aid and an incentive to thought. For faith neither substitutes for ational science nor contradicts it; faith gives us starting points, facts, n which the science of theology can be constructed, just as experience

fire/image/shadow=sun/real thing/reflection), he says: "This is . . . what was ter called *analogia proportionalitatis*"! (p. 188, n. 29).

and the original insight of the mind gives us starting points for physics, mathematics, philosophy, and other sciences. A fact of faith binds the mind only in the sense that the discovery of a physical law limits the speculation of a physicist; it is an addition to human knowledge and to the potentialities of human insight just as the discovery of radium opens new avenues of investigation.

The mysteries of faith are therefore the beginning of a growth in understanding that should deepen and guide life and reach ultimately the perfection of the beatific vision. Knowledge remains therefore always the true perfection of the human intellect; faith seeks understanding precisely because it is the seed of the vision of God.

The starting points of other sciences are, however, gained by the normal powers of the human mind and so are subject to rational criticism. The starting points of theology, the mysteries of faith, are communicated to man by God; they constitute a participation in the wisdom of God himself and are therefore not susceptible of direct rational validation. They can only be maintained in their purity and unity by God himself. History and Christian experience have made it clear that God has chosen to so maintain them through a guaranteed teaching authority.

Hence, to look upon the teaching authority of the Church as an inversion is to misunderstand the nature of faith. The inversion here would rather be to submit authority to reason, for this would be to submit God's wisdom to human reason—a true Platonic inversion.[5] Just as the right opinion of the mass of the Platonic state was to be maintained by submission to the teaching of the philosophers who possessed insight, so right opinion in matters of faith is to be maintained by submission to the teaching of God, who alone, in matters of divine mystery, possesses insight.

As a matter of fact, Plato himself readily saw the need of a teaching authority—even in matters purely rational. Few could ever gain the dialectician's insight; but his insight was to impose itself upon the rest of society, by persuasion, by education, and, even, by police measures. The subordinate orders in the Platonic state would never "see" the evidential grounds for the teaching of the philosophers—only philosophic insight could give them that; they had to accept the authority of the

[5] No one ever had a profounder understanding of the role of authority in religion (and indeed in all human life) than St. Augustine, whom Professor Wild mentions as a Christian leader suggestive of what Plato meant by his "guardians" (p. 108). On the other hand, no one has ever understood so well that faith gives real and potential knowledge, otherwise beyond the reach of man. The main Catholic tradition, especially the Augustinian tradition, has maintained this same position.

philosopher as a child accepts the authority of his parents or the layman accepts the authority of the expert. More than this, Plato, in maturer years, recognized in *The Statesman* that, in actual life, a mere written document, rigidly interpreted, might do duty for the living insight of the true philosopher.

At this point we touch the hard practical problem involved in Professor Wild's thesis. It is undoubtedly magnificent and right to speak ideally of a society organized according to insight; but how can such a state be organized and achieved? Plato recognized—and history supports him—that this insight is hardly attainable by a few and not at all by the many. The problem is, of course, complicated now by the fact of revelation and of man's supernatural elevation. The ideal society would be one in which all men accepted—and lived by—the true faith and the insights and conclusions of true philosophy. To approximate this, all who have the true faith and sound philosophy must co-operate to bring men to such insight into the truth as they are capable of and, beyond that, to bring them to accept the right authorities in all fields to the degree justified by the value of the authority itself qua authority. Co-operation is possible and fruitful at any level of human culture; the theologian and the philosopher will find an ally in any human being—no matter what he is, craftsman, artist, statesman—who, in his own work, is free from the inversion of sophistry. Right order in any part of human culture necessarily aids the effort to universal right order.

The study of human culture is of necessity a study of man in the concrete totality of his living. Hence complete right order is only possible through those principles which explain and guide human life in the concrete. This is the reason why Maritain maintains that theology and religion are basic necessary means for the reconstruction of society. Hence he is not guilty of "theologizing," and Professor Wild is quite mistaken in turning Professor Gilson's analysis of "theologizing" against Maritain (pp. 8-9).

But in recognizing the practical subordination of all human science to theology and of all living to religion, the essential and proper work of natural reason in its own order must be maintained. Here Professor Wild criticizes Thomistic philosophers for not working out a detailed theory of human culture; they have, he believes, devoted themselves, in the practical sciences, too exclusively to the supernatural order and to detached generalizations (pp. 6-9). This criticism seems well founded. The principles of a philosophy of human culture are already possessed by Thomistic philosophy; they should be worked out in the concrete along lines similar to those followed by Professor Wild in this book. If Professor Wild hereby directs the efforts of more Thomists in this direction, he will have done a great service.

In conclusion, it should be remarked that only a few of the larger points in *Plato's Theory of Man* have here been examined. Selection is forced upon a reviewer by the very wealth of analysis, observation, and criticism presented. Attention should be called to the interesting treatment of *The Parmenides* (pp. 205-41), *The Theaetetus* (pp. 242-72), and *The Sophist* (pp. 273-311). While the interpretations do not seem wholly sound to this reviewer, only detailed research and criticism could yield an evidential judgment.

Professor Wild's book deserves a wide and thoughtful reading. Thomists in particular will profit by finding herein both agreement and criticism.

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The State in Catholic Thought. By Heinrich A. Rommen, LL.D. Herder, St. Louis, 1945. Pp. viii + 747. $6.00.

To review a work of such substantial proportions as *The State in Catholic Thought* is a difficult task. The book is indeed a treatise in political philosophy. It attempts to clarify the principles and characteristics of the philosophy of the state as it has developed and found shape and substance in Catholic thought. The author emphasizes in his preface that the adjective "Catholic" is used with reference to the place where this philosophy grew and found its home and is not meant to imply that it is based upon theology or revelation, but rather on natural reason and on rational principles. Special point is also made of the fact that spiritual quietism is not a true Catholic attitude; although grace in the absolute sense is independent of secular conditions, the social security and the peaceful order of secular life should be guaranteed if generally the Christian is to be able to fulfill his higher and more sublime tasks.

The table of contents suggests an orderly and comprehensive treatment of the whole field of political philosophy. Part One, entitled "Philosophical Foundations," includes chapters on social being, the idea of man, political theology, the organic view of the state, and several additional chapters on the origin, growth, and content of the natural law. Part Two involves an analysis of the philosophy of the state, under such topical headings as the origin of the state, the state as a perfect society, the state as a moral organism, the nature of the common good, sovereignty, and forms of government. Part Three is entitled "Church and State." It is probably the best general analysis of this difficult subject, from both the historical and the analytical points of view, that has yet been written. The chapters included in this part of the

book, dealing with Church and state in the era of faith, the era of the Reformation, and the modern secularized state are brilliant, penetrating, and sympathetic; they deserve to be read by scholars and students alike. The fourth and final part of the book is concerned with international relations; it offers chapters on the nature and scope of international law, the Catholic doctrine about war, the means of avoiding war, and the basis of international peace.

Viewed in its entirety, *The State in Catholic Thought* is a book of real merit. It reveals in its author a breadth of knowledge and a depth of understanding, in the field of political thought, that few other Catholics can claim. Particularly penetrating is Professor Rommen's analysis of the origin and growth of the idea of natural law, of its content as found in commutative, distributive, and legal justice, and of its relationship to positive law. As already suggested, his treatment of the whole subject of Church and state is of such quality as to defy criticism.

Unfortunately, in this reviewer's opinion, that section of the book devoted to the philosophy of the state is not characterized by the same high qualities. Rather it is unclear, confusing, repetitive, and, to a certain extent, unrealistic. Only a few illustrations can be offered here to justify such a criticism. With regard to the fundamental problem of the nature of the state, the author offers a chapter entitled "The State as a Moral Organism"; but he proceeds in this chapter to devote only a small degree of attention to the subject indicated. Rather, he discusses such topics as the social and political virtues, political freedom and morality, power as an element of the state, political power and private economic power, the weakening of social ethics, and the like. While of course these various topics are important in any analysis of the entire area of politics, it is not clear that they are very directly related to the nature of the state as a moral organism. In one place it is stated that "power, the application of force as a factor serving the end of the state, is one of its essential elements. As a result of original sin, man was left darkened in understanding and weakened in will" (p. 291). Yet in another place it is contended that only Protestants find the origin of the state in sin, and that for Catholic thinkers the state would have developed out of human nature even in the state of pure nature. It is admitted, however, that in this state of pure nature only a directive and not a coercive power would be necessary. Surely, to call a purely directive authority a state, and to insist also that coercive power is an *essential* element of the state, is to exhibit loose thinking as to the precise nature of the state.

Probably the most essential problem in politics is that of defining the nature of the "common good," of giving to this term a content specific

enough to distinguish it clearly on the one hand from the sum of the goods of the individuals composing the state (incidentally, in what sense do individuals "compose" a state?) and on the other hand from a good separate and distinct from that of the individual members of the state. Admittedly, this is an extremely difficult assignment. Even so, it is submitted that clarity of thought on the problem is not likely to be promoted by statements like the following: "We can truly say that in the ultimate sense common good and individual good coincide though they do not absorb each other" (p. 327); or,

> Here again is evident the eminence of the common good and its difference from a mere sum of the private goods of individuals, though the common good grows out of the particular goods, and in the normal state of affairs coincides with the particular goods of the individuals. It follows, too, that in the case of conflict the private good of an individual has to step aside, though one cannot say that the private goods of all have to step aside, because without them a common good is in reality impossible (p. 324). .

This reviewer, though willing to concede that the fault may lie in his own deficiencies, must nevertheless insist that language such as this confuses rather than clarifies his own thinking on the nature of the common good.

Other large aspects of the problem of political ethics are treated too sketchily. The entire question of the right of resistance, the conditions under which it becomes legitimate, and the aspects of its use is disposed of in three pages. The problems of the proper limits on freedom of speech and association, of the degree to which socialization of property may be justified, and of the conditions under which a state may properly take human life do not fare much better.

Even with such limitations, it must be admitted that Professor Rommen's book is deserving of careful study by all students of political philisophy. Such study will add materially to the knowledge of any reader, however erudite, with respect to the political thought of outstanding Catholic authorities through the centuries. More important, it will stimulate further thought, on the part of any reader, in the perennial problems of politics, and will thereby develop what is even more valuable than mere knowledge, namely, real understanding.

PAUL G. STEINBICKER

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BOOK NOTICES

DANTE ALIGHIERI: CITIZEN OF CHRISTENDOM. By Gerald G. Walsh, S.J. Bruce, Milwaukee, 1946. Pp. 183. $3.00.

In 1945 Father Walsh of Fordham University, editor of *Thought* and author of several volumes including *Medieval Humanism* and *The Emperor Charles IV,* was invited to deliver the Lowell Lectures in Boston. This invitation of itself betokens the status of Father Walsh as a scholar. We who could not hear him in person are fortunate to have the present book, which contains the lectures conveniently arranged in eight chapters and some thirty-seven subdivisions.

The lectures must have been a delight to listen to. Father Walsh's personality shines through the print: he has erudition, synthetic and analytic powers of a high order, and, best of all, the gift of style, that grace beyond the reach of art so often and so lamentably lacking in the work of most American scholars, especially of literature. The writing is compact, rapid, and concrete. With a few strokes Father Walsh sketches in the background, then devotes himself to an original examination of Dante's character and art. Resisting the temptation to dally with the multitude of commentators, he cuts through the jungle of scholarship and goes straight to the fountains, as the full but inconspicuous documentation testifies.

The subtitle of this volume is to be taken seriously, even though it has a special contemporary appeal. Dante has been called "the central man." We have lost our centrality and are trying hysterically but uninstructedly to get it back. Dante was a whole man. He was a whole man because he was a Christian. The application to our time is apparent.

Dante saw the need for Catholic unity, a unity that was breaking up even in his own day. In 1321, when he died, Petrarch, "the first modern man," was already in his eighteenth year. The heart, not the head, was becoming the sovereign ruler.

> Between the ancient age of reason, into which Dante was born, and the modern age of revolt, in which he died, falls the *Divine Comedy.* It fills the chasm between these two worlds. It is a bridge between the age of the head and the age of the heart. Even before

> the *Divine Comedy* was conceived, the young Dante had begun to build for himself such a bridge. "Love," he says on the first page of his first book, "was the lord of my soul." He immediately adds: "Never did love rule me without the faithful counsel of reason." It is this sublime contradiction, this seemingly double allegiance to the "lordship of love" and "the rule of reason," that makes Dante so important today.

After distinguishing between Dante the man and Dante the hero of the *Divine Comedy,* the latter merely a symbol of mature human nature, Father Walsh rapidly re-creates the life and times of the poet, integrates the art and thought of his prose and minor verse with the fine gold of the epic, and rises finally to the apex of Dante's philosophic and theological poetry. Especially fine are his demonstrations of the poet's technique in such famous passages of the *Comedy* as the cantos of Paolo and Francesca, Ulysses, and Ugolino. He never loses sight, however, of his unifying principle that "whatever elements went to the making of Dante's poetry—passion, imagination, vision, music, inspiration, faith, and prayer—he thought of art, primarily, as a work of reason."

There are extremely few errors in the typography of this book, filled though it is with quotations in Latin and Italian. Author and publisher alike deserve credit for a superior achievement.

VICTOR M. HAMM

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ESSAYS IN RECONSTRUCTION. Edited by Dom Ralph Russell. Sheed and Ward, New York, 1946. Pp. xi + 176. $2.50.

This book, a collection of ten essays written by English clergymen and laymen, aims at setting forth the principles of reconstruction embodied in Catholicism. It is not intended as a complete survey of the Catholic position, nor do any of the individual essays claim to be an exhaustive treatment of their topics; but the book "contains a series of selected approaches" which give a "fair picture of some of the things Catholics stand for, of their actual aims and desires in the modern world" (p. vii).

Here, briefly, are the fundamental ideas in the Christian reconstruction outlined in this book: In the natural order man is a rational animal (chap. i, "Reconstruction and the Natural Man"). But God raised man to a higher, a supernatural level by the gift of sanctifying grace and set before him a supernatural destiny: the eternal possession of God through knowledge and love. Man, however, deliberately disobeyed God and thereby lost grace. Centuries later, God sent his own Divine Son, Jesus Christ, to redeem mankind. By his temporal life and death, Christ made reparation for sin and merited man's return to the adopted

sonship of God (chap. ii, "The Leaven"). He instituted the Church to apply, through the holy sacrifice of the Mass and the sacraments, the grace he merited; and he desired that all should be saved (chap. iii, "The Catholic Action"). He desired, too, that his supernaturalizing influence should penetrate all human endeavor—education, science, statecraft, economics, social life, and so on (the chapters on "Christian Education," "Catholicism and Science," "Catholicism and English Literature," "Catholics and Economic Reconstruction," "Aims of Youth in Peace and War," "Youth and Young Christian Workers").

Three of the articles are splendid—"The Catholic Action," (that is, the sacrifice of the Mass) by Dom Illtyd Trethowan; "Catholicism and English Literature," by Dom Hilary Steuert and Dom Sebastian Moore; and "Catholics and Economic Reconstruction," by Michael Fogarty. Other articles, it is true, are not so successful, and professional philosophers and theologians will find little in the book that is new. Still, *Essays in Reconstruction* is, within the limits set for itself, a fairly clear and complete review of Catholic principles for rebuilding the world.

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BREVILOQUIUM BY ST. BONAVENTURE. Translated by Erwin Esser Nemmers. Herder, St. Louis, 1946. Pp. xxii + 248. $3.00.

This very readable translation of the closely-written *Breviloquium* deserves high praise, for the translator rarely fails in presenting the thought of St. Bonaventure clearly and without misleading paraphrases. Comparable in many ways to the *Compendium Theologiae* of St. Thomas, the *Breviloquium* was composed as a handbook of theology. Though St. Bonaventure approaches each division of his work as a theologian, the work contains many points of interest for the philosopher, such as the theory of illumination, the divine attributes to which reason has access, the *rationes seminales,* and free will and the problem of evil.

The work is divided into seven sections: the Trinity, creation, corruption of sin, the Incarnation, grace, the sacraments, and the final judgment. The method of presentation is simple and uniform throughout the work: a statement of the Church's teaching on the dogma under consideration, followed by a brief explanation of each point.

Though the present translation will be of little service for one previously unacquainted with St. Bonaventure, the student of medieval philosophy who is barred from the original Latin should find it very helpful. In a few instances the reader may be perplexed by the

ambiguity of the English. This might have been avoided if the translator had seen fit to explain in a footnote the precise meaning of St. Bonaventure's statement or to use the usually reprehensible means of paraphrase. Thus, on page 82, the phrase "because of God" (a translation of *propter Deum*) might have been paraphrased or explained to bring out the thought. So too the phrase "from Himself" for *a Se* seems to weaken the forcefulness of the Latin.

JOHN BLEWETT, S.J.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS FROM MEDIEVAL SOURCES. By Clarissa P. Farrar and Austin P. Evans. Columbia University Press, New York, 1946. Pp. vii + 534. $7.50.

This bibliography is the result of fifteen years of work devoted to producing a book of practical use "to the general reader or student and which may also serve as a first guide to the scholar" (p. ix). It lists, alphabetically by authors, all translations of works produced during the period from Constantine the Great to the year 1500 within an "area roughly inclusive of Europe, northern Africa, and western Asia" (p. viii). The matter is limited to translations of "literary sources"; documents and paraphrases are generally omitted, though the authors, for practical considerations, have allowed themselves considerable latitude. The work not only lists translations but comments on their adequacy, mutual relationships, and so on, though on these points the notes are professedly incomplete.

The bibliography is a valuable addition to our tools of study and research and should become to standard reference work for all those interested in "European culture during the Middle Ages" (p. viii).

ROBERT J. HENLE, S.J.

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